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Abstract: Counting conservatively, and ignoring physical injuries and mental trauma, data show about 
100 million mass atrocity-related deaths since 1900. Occurring in war- and in peacetime, and of enormous 
scale, severity, and brutality, they are geographically widespread, occur with surprising frequency, and 
can be long-lasting in their adverse effects on economic and human development, wellbeing, and wealth. 
As such, they are a major economic concern. This article synthesizes very diverse and widely dispersed 
theoretical and empirical literatures, addressing two gaps: a “mass atrocities gap” in the economics 
literature and an “economics gap” in mass atrocities scholarship. Our goals are, first, for noneconomists to 
learn how economic inquiry contributes to understanding the causes and conduct of mass atrocities and 
possibly to their mitigation and prevention and, second, to survey and synthesize for economists a broad 
sweep of literatures to serve as a common platform on which to base further work in this field. 
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1. Mass Atrocities: Why Care? 
Mass atrocities are episodes of large-scale violence committed against unarmed populations.
 
In 
war- and peacetime, they occur with perplexing frequency and geographic reach; data suggest an 
average onset of nearly two mass atrocities per year since 1900, occurring on all continents 
except Antarctica. They include the infliction of injuries and deaths on civilians in the intuitively 
obvious meaning, and also forms of gendered and age-selective violence, forced removals of 
victims from their homelands, and the psychological trauma resulting from any such acts both 
for the surviving direct victims and for indirectly affected people such as family members. Mass 
atrocities—of which genocides are but the most prominent example—can be events of enormous 
scale. For example, the sum of all deaths from all domestic and transnational terror events 
recorded for the nearly 50 years since 1970 is about 380,000 (University of Maryland, 2018). 
This is far below the number killed in the 1994 Rwandan genocide alone (500,000 to 800,000 
deaths). Mass atrocity data show, in all, a conservative estimate of about 100 million deaths since 
1900, three times as many deaths as from all natural disasters (see Section 2). Kiernan (2007), 
Pinker (2011, pp. 320–43), and White (2012) provide overviews, and evocative descriptions, of 
varieties of mass atrocities across history and geography.
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Mass atrocities can generate inordinately long-lasting adverse effects on economic, political, 
and cultural development. For example, Soudis, Inklaar, and Maseland (2016), in a cross-country 
model of nation-states suffering an episode of genocide in the post-Holocaust era, find that the 
cumulative effect on per-worker GDP shows a rapid decline of about 10 percent, which then 
persists even ten years post-genocide onset. For a country-specific case, Hodler (2019) finds that 
Rwanda’s GDP declined 58 percent in 1994, its year of genocide, and then took 17 years to 
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return to its estimated counterfactual level. Although there are cases in which forced population 
homogenization—which is what mass atrocities often amount to—appear to improve the 
economic fortunes of an atrocity-imposing group (for example, Indonesia post-1966; see 
Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2016), empirical case studies also show that economic and social 
development can remain attenuated for half a century and longer (Acemoglu, Hassan, and 
Robinson, 2011; Urbatch, 2017). On occasion, development ceases altogether for the atrocity-
suffering group, as in the case of the Native American population in California in the 1800s 
(Madley, 2016). Even before inventing the word genocide, Lemkin (1933) noted that “acts of 
extermination [include] actions undertaken to ruin the economic existence of the members of a 
collectivity” (our emphasis). The causal mechanisms at work point, especially, to demographic 
disruptions (Kugler, 2016) and to changes in cultural norms, beliefs, and values in surviving 
populations that adversely affect social fabric, political participation, and economic activity 
(Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Grosfeld, Rodnyansky, and Zhuravskaya, 2013).  
Still, in addition to obvious humanitarian and economic development concerns, why should 
mass atrocities interest economists (and why should economics interest mass atrocity scholars)? 
We have two answers: Economics can help elucidate the mechanisms by which mass atrocities 
are carried out and it can contribute to an improved understanding of why mass atrocities occur 
(and recur) in the first place. Starting with the standard core of economic theory, this can be done 
by examining the rationality of the means and the rationality of the ends—the ‘how’ and the 
‘why’ of mass atrocity (Ferrero, 2017a) —and then be enriched with insights drawn from 
psychology, sociology, and political analysis. For instance, paradigms drawn from behavioral 
and identity economics, based on theories of preference formation (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), 
motivated beliefs (Gino, Norton, and Weber, 2016), and of beliefs as assets (Bénabou and Tirole, 
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2011), can help explain both atrocity leaders’ and followers’ behaviors. Social network 
economics can show how mass atrocities may emerge spontaneously and unpredictably and how 
they diffuse over a network of atrocity perpetrators. And concepts in politics such as power, 
ideology, and the instrumental use of hate, in addition to transaction costs, the difficulty of 
benefit-capture, and free-riding in collective decisionmaking contexts can help explain why mass 
atrocities, once started, are so hard to stop.  
The economic theories surveyed in this article help to more fully address questions related to 
the rationality and nonrationality of mass atrocities, compliance by large (often oppositional) 
segments of populations in mass atrocities, and how an entire social structure of mass atrocity 
architects, bureaucrats, on-the-ground perpetrators, suppliers of the means of murder, silent 
bystanders, conformers, enthusiasts, opportunists, resisters, third parties—and victims—coheres, 
operates, and evolves. In the process, we also raise questions regarding overlooked events (many 
mass atrocity events remain uncaptured in databases), overlooked actors (victims’ choices and 
circumstances are strangely underresearched), and overlooked consequences (for example, 
interventions that backfire and make things worse).  
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 characterizes the study of mass atrocities in terms 
of definition, scholarly context, actors at play, and data. Focusing more on the causes and 
conduct of mass atrocities than on their consequences, Section 3, the heart of the article, then 
explores four entwined strands of economic theory as they pertain to mass atrocity. Empirical 
evidence on mass atrocity risk, prediction, and intervention is summarized in Section 4. Section 
5 takes an illustrative look at atrocity prevention through the lens of the economics of 
international law. Section 6 concludes with a short reflection on what has been done, has not 
been done, and can be done. Our main contributions are, first, to synthesize very diverse and 
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dispersed work across streams of economic theory and, second, to comprehensively survey and 
assess the empirical literature.  
 
2. Characterizing Mass Atrocities 
In this section, we briefly discuss aspects of the definition of mass atrocity (Section 2.1), 
scholarly history and context (2.2), mass atrocity actors (2.3), and relevant data (2.4). 
2.1 Definition 
The phrase mass atrocity is an umbrella term, covering a variety of concepts and offenses. Much 
of the genocide studies literature has settled, for now, on the term atrocity crime, avoiding the 
qualifier “mass” but adding “crime” (Straus, 2016). Article I of the Statutes of Rome, 
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC), uses the phrase “most serious crimes of 
international concern” and, Article 5 (and amendments) defines four such crimes: genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Genocide, for instance, 
“means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) 
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on 
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.”
2
 In genocide, people are singled out for who they are (or 
deemed to be) rather than for what they (may) have done.  
Crimes against humanity are callous acts committed in a widespread or systematic manner 
against civilians as individuals rather than as members of an enumerated group; war crimes 
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constitute serious violations of the laws and customs applicable to armed conflict between or 
within states. In contrast, the crime of aggression refers to “the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State,” and thus 
need not involve atrocities. Genocides and crimes against humanity can occur in wartime and 
peacetime, whereas war crimes can occur in war only. Politicides, the massive killing of political 
opponents, are not a type of genocide under international law but scholars and others often treat 
them equivalently. They may, or may not, constitute a crime against humanity or a war crime. 
Rummel (1997) popularized the term democide (“the murder of any person or people by a 
government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder”). But democide is not defined in 
law. Another term used in the literature is ethnic cleansing, which usually means the forced 
expulsion of a people-group from a territory of habitual settlement. It, too, is not a crime 
recognized in law. 
Despite the broad coverage these concepts and terms appear to provide, it is unclear whether, 
for instance, the killing of several tens of thousands of Viet Cong suspects during the second 
Indochina war, or the state-sanctioned massive killing of suspected narcotics dealers in the 
Philippines over the past few years, or even the killings of tens of thousands of people in 
Mexico’s narcotics-related violence since the mid-2000s are “most serious crimes of 
international concern.” Even if not, these and other cases, such as politically motivated or 
otherwise recklessly induced famines for purposes of political control (for example, Ukraine, 
China, Ethiopia), are atrocities on a massive scale.
3
 Mass atrocity databases thus include at least 
some such cases. Importantly, perpetrators of atrocities need not be states, but nor it is clear that 
perpetrators then must be nonstate actors. For instance, past or current practices of treating 
females as male property (Europe), footbinding (China), sex-selective abortions (India), and 
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 Hryn (2008) characterizes the 1930s Ukrainian famine in a Soviet context as “hunger by design.” 
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female genital cutting (parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East) are examples of widespread, 
massive gendered violence even if at times locally condoned, rising to the status of social norms, 
and unrecognized as crimes in law. These practices, neither state nor nonstate but perpetrated by 
“society,” are instances of massive violence, with attendant economic damage. 
 At its broadest, the subject matter, then, is the class of atrocities that are “massive,” carried 
out by whomever and for whatever underlying political, economic, or cultural reason. It includes 
massive crimes not deemed atrocities and mass atrocities not deemed crimes. For science, such a 
broad definition makes the operational setting of conceptual and quantitative boundaries 
difficult. But for economists at least, any violation of people’s physical, mental, and cultural 
wellbeing on a massive scale is relevant because it sabotages the development of human capital 
needed for the betterment of society. 
The legal texts, domestic or international, do not help much as they restrict attention to a 
limited class of atrocities and eschew quantification. In contrast, scientists create codeable 
definitions and metrics but often restrict them to killings, which is incomplete as atrocities 
cannot be restricted to killing alone: The UN Genocide Convention, for instance, lists killing as 
merely one of five enumerated acts, each of which can constitute genocide. For example, “(d) 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] (e) Forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group” arguably constituted acts of genocide in Australia’s 
treatment of its indigenous populations well into the twentieth century (Tatz, 2013).
4
 
Just as the conceptual boundaries of “atrocity” are blurred in scholarship and law, so is the 
numeric definition of “massive,” if only because it is unclear which time scale to use. The 
literature frequently employs a cutoff point of 1,000 or more noncombatant civilians killed over 
                                                     
4
 Relatedly, the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslovia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) “have 
stated clearly that no numerical threshold had to be crossed for atrocities to count as genocide” as long as certain 
aspects of the UN Convention’s definition of genocide are met (Meierhenrich, 2014, p. 29). 
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some period of time, implying that if 800 are killed within that time, and another 800 in the 
ensuing time period, an atrocity is not counted as such. Indeed, one of the dangers in scholarship 
and policymaking is to equate mass atrocities with genocidal mass killings, leading to a “canon 
of general acceptance” which includes Armenia, the Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda, the former 
Yugoslavia, and Sudan’s Darfur region “but virtually no other cases” (Bloxham and Moses, 
2010, p. 4). For this reason we refer in this article to many additional atrocity cases worldwide, 
pre- and post-Holocaust. 
In a classic text, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, Lewis Richardson (1960) starts his death 
counts with n=1. This removes aggregation as a definitional problem. Indeed, time- and 
geocoded event-based datasets such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset 
(ACLED) go into a scientifically desirable direction, limiting aggregations of counts, geographic 
space, and time, leaving aggregation to researchers’ specific interests. Consequently, analysts 
need not agree on a single dependent variable, nor search for a single “best” model of mass 
atrocities. The set of appropriate theoretical and empirical approaches and models therefore is 
wide-ranging and can be eclectic (Sections 3 and 4). That said, we must reckon with the 
literature’s current conventions of counts, space, and time, more so since most of the relevant 
databases are built to reflect these conventions. Thus, much of the literature covered deals with 
cases of 1,000 or more deaths of unarmed civilians. But this should not blind readers to the much 
broader scale, scope, and severity of mass atrocities.  
2.2 A Brief History of Mass Atrocity and Genocide Studies 
In the two decades following the Holocaust, historians and social scientists paid little scholarly 
attention to Nazi-Germany’s efforts to exterminate Jews and other people-groups. Nor were 
other mass atrocities—such as mass killings of Herero and Nama people in then South-West 
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Africa in the early 1900s, slaughter of Armenians in the late Ottoman empire, destruction of 
indigenous peoples in Australia and the Americas, weaponization of hunger in the man-made 
mass starvation of Ukrainians in the 1930s, and cases of mass elimination of civilians during 
wars and empire building throughout ancient and medieval history (Pinker, 2011)—subject of 
much social scientific inquiry in the immediate years following the Holocaust. A breakthrough 
occurred with the publication of Raul Hilberg’s (1961) study, The Destruction of the European 
Jews. Considered seminal, Hilberg is credited by genocide scholars (Meierhenrich, 2014, pp. 5–
6) in helping to create an academic field of study focused upon the origins and consequences of 
the Holocaust, later extended to the academic study of other mass atrocities. (The field is often 
named “genocide studies” in reflection of its early focus on genocides.) By the 1970s and 1980s, 
“first-generation genocide scholarship” (Straus, 2007a, p. 480) used concepts and tools from the 
social sciences and rigorous historical analyses, led by sociologists (for example, Dadrian, Fein, 
Horowitz, Kuper, Porter), social psychologists (Charny, Staub), political scientists (Harff, Krain, 
Melson, Rummel), and historians (Adalian, Browning, Chalk, Hovannisian). These pioneers’ 
work was significant for at least three reasons. First, they emphasized the intentional aspects of 
perpetration by mass atrocity architects and “troops” as well as the various incentives that 
nonperpetrators had to be acquiescent bystanders. Many of these scholars emphasized that mass 
atrocities were argued (or perceived) by perpetrators as instrumentally rational in achieving 
certain goals for political leaders, including destroying an emerging threat, positioning oneself 
more strongly during war, eliminating a persistent rival, acquiring land or other resources, and/or 
establishing reputation. Importantly, as early as 1979, sociologist Helen Fein emphasized that to 
account for genocide, “we must consider how it may be motivated or appear as a rational choice 
to the perpetrator” (Fein, 1979, p. 7). Second, the first generation of empirical and historical case 
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studies established that architects and on-the-ground perpetrators of mass atrocities are, by and 
large, “ordinary people,” scoring, for example, within normal ranges on standard personality 
tests, and that their behaviors, outside of atrocity perpetration, in such contexts as family life and 
community relations were normal and even commendable (Waller, 2007, chs. 5–8). Moreover, 
depending on the case at hand, atrocity perpetrators could number in the many thousands. This, 
third, led these early scholars to wrestle with the relative importance of individual agency and of 
psychological, social, and political contexts in understanding the recruitment into and behavior 
of perpetrators, as well as actions and inactions by other actors in mass atrocity circumstances. 
From the early 1990s, a second generation of scholars has put the field on increasingly 
stronger theoretical and empirical foundations, also aiming to integrate genocide studies back 
into their home disciplines (see Straus, 2007a; Meierhenrich, 2014, pp. 9–18 for synopses). We 
highlight five themes that permeate this generation of scholarship. First, the rational and strategic 
aspects of mass atrocity perpetration became well-established in the field and across the social 
science disciplines (Valentino, 2004). Second, to arrive at richer models of the choices actors 
make in atrocity contexts, scholars argue that perspectives on the rationality of mass atrocity 
should be integrated with insights that emphasize nonrational aspects, drawn from psychology, 
sociology, and political science (Staub, 1989; Melson, 1992; Fein, 1993). Third, it is increasingly 
recognized that emphasizing context or individual agency in the social scientific analysis of mass 
atrocity must give way to research that includes both: “Structure and agency are inextricably 
intertwined,” write Bloxham and Moses (2010, p. 6). Later on, we will argue that modern 
economics is particularly well-suited and poised to help effect such multidisciplinary integration. 
Fourth, the latest scholarship is incorporating dynamic and feedback effects missing from most 
earlier studies, including social evolutionary processes that can lead to a tipping point into mass 
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atrocity, contagion effects in which mass atrocity acceptance among a population spreads like a 
“disease,” and mass atrocity as an emergent phenomenon in which seemingly trivial changes in a 
personal, social, or political condition can have dramatic effects on the risk or spread of mass 
atrocity. Finally, fifth, we note the striking gap in work by economists, relative to other scholars, 
on understanding mass atrocity as an economic proposition and on the challenges of mass 
atrocity risk and prevention. This gap is beginning to be addressed, as our article will show.  
2.3 The Actors: Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders 
Three broad classes of actors in mass atrocities are perpetrators, victims, and bystanders 
(Hilberg, 1992; Ehrenreich and Cole, 2005). Among the set of perpetrators are architects (who 
envision, plan, and have the power, authority, and control necessary to drive atrocities), 
bureaucrats (who implement, supervise, and manage the machinery of destruction), and troops 
(who inflict the actual harm). All three share responsibility for the atrocities they jointly commit. 
Victims are classified by perpetrators as “others” (an out-group) based upon some identifier the 
victims effectively are unable to offset (Ehrenreich and Cole, 2005, pp. 218–9), even if victims 
attempt to do so by such means as cultural assimilation or religious conversion. Victims have 
been further distinguished by their degree of vulnerability leading into and during mass atrocity, 
their age and gender, and the nature of their victimhood (for example, death, injury, loss of 
family members, or loss of homeland or wealth) (Hilberg, 1992; Ehrenreich and Cole, 2005; 
Donà, 2018). Bystanders are socially and spatially situated between perpetrators and victims 
(Staub, 1989, p. 20; Donà, 2018, p. 2), sometimes outside the immediately affected society, for 
example in diasporas. Bystander actions can range from actively helping victims, to resisting 
perpetrators, to neither helping nor resisting, to refusing to actively participate in the destruction 
but agreeing with the ideology to do so, to disagreeing with the destruction ideology but being 
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willing to benefit from it as in opportunistic looting (Ehrenreich and Cole, 2005; Donà, 2018). 
Hilberg (1992) collapses these behaviors into three subcategories: helpers, onlookers, and 
gainers.  
 Actor identities are not fixed (Fujii, 2009). Behaviors can be fluid and multiplex as, for 
example, when a perpetrator who was killing Tutsi simultaneously acted to rescue a specific 
Tutsi who was a former soccer teammate (Donà, 2018, p. 12; see also Campbell, 2010) or of 
victims who are coerced to become victimizers (Drumbl, 2016). Individuals can also 
dramatically change their behavior over time. A well-known example is Oskar Schindler who 
joined the Nazi party and enriched himself from slave labor (Staub, 1993, p. 335) but later risked 
his wealth and life to help Jews.  
 Mass atrocity perpetrators, victims, and bystanders are usually conceived of in uniquely 
personalized ways. Yet they also encompass organizations such as parties, agencies, bureaus, 
firms, and international governmental organizations. For example, when the United Nations 
observes an on-going atrocity but does little to help, it can be classified as an onlooker—raising 
the issue of collective responsibility for harm done (Drumbl, 2007; Bellamy and Dunne, 2016).  
2.4 Data and Scope of the Problem 
Stitching together various databases, scholars know, for the years 1900–2017, of close to 200 
mass atrocities in which states deliberately killed at least 1,000 of their own or other states’ 
noncombatant civilians per case; of these, data sources provide fatality estimates for 149 cases. 
Furthermore, data sources permit identification of mass killings perpetrated by nonstate actors 
from 1989–2017, again with 1,000 or more victims, of which at least 39 have occurred.
5
 Culled 
                                                     
5
 Choosing the year 1900 as our cutoff for state-perpetrated mass atrocities (and 1989, for nonstate atrocities) is 
dictated, in part, by the limits of available databases. Our point is to numerically illustrate the sheer scale of 
atrocities and, at present, this only seems possible for the late modern and contemporary eras. It is desirable to 
extend databases even into the pre-historic era (Keeley, 1996). Certainly, scholarship in ancient and modern history 
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from various data sources (see Appendix), Figure 1 plots each case at the onset year. Time is 
displayed on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis shows victim counts, but on a log scale. We 
refer to this as the Mass Atrocity Log Scale (MALOS).
6
 The circles represent state-perpetrated 
mass atrocities; the triangles constitute nonstate cases. Also included are 14 “X” cases 
representing mass killings perpetrated by unidentified actors, 1995–2017. Although they cannot 
be tied to a unified decisionmaking process or party responsible, the emergence and increasing 




[Figure 1 here] 
The estimated cumulative death toll depicted in Figure 1 is about 100 million people. This 
understates the true toll because the number refers to cases documented in readily available 
databases only and, even among documented cases, only to those for which fatality estimates are 
available. Even with these restrictions (including the 1,000+ restriction), the estimated fatalities 
fall within the range of the number of people who died due to bubonic plague—the Black 
Death—in the mid-1300s in Eurasia and Europe (about 75 to 200 million people) and far exceed 
total deaths worldwide from natural disasters (~33 million), 1900–2016 (EM-DAT, 2018). Not 
included in our counts are nonfatal physical injuries and mental trauma. Thus, if one were 
willing to assume—and scattered research suggests as much
8
—that for every civilian killed, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
occasionaly points to economic effects of mass slaughter. Likewise, mass atrocities perpetrated by nonstate actors—
anti-Jewish pogroms and anti-black lynchings, for example—are not recent phenomena. 
6
 A linear scale would visually emphasize killings in the tens of millions of people and thus underemphasize the 
killings of “mere” thousands. In contrast, a log-scale nearly conflates killings in the millions with killings in the tens 
of millions. Neither scale is ideal. 
7
 It is possible that unidentified actors have been of importance for some time so that “emergence” is an artefact of 
recent data collection. 
8
 For example, DeBryne (2017, Table 1) tallies U.S. armed forces casualties in all U.S. wars, 1775–1991, of which 
the number wounded always outstrip the number of total deaths (battle deaths and all other deaths such as those due 
to accidents, disease, infections, or suicides); Hicks, et al. (2011a, p. 906) estimate 2 to 5 times the number of Iraqi 
civilians injured in suicide bomb attacks than civilians killed in such attacks; Crawford (2015, Tables 3 and 4, p. 18), 
studying Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001–2014, also finds a ratio of over 2:1 of injured to killed civilians. Internally 
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another two are physically injured and a further two traumatized in other ways (for instance, 
witnessing and/or fleeing atrocity), then the combined casualty toll from the cases reported in 
Figure 1 alone reaches about half a billion people.  
If the sheer scale of mass atrocities is enormous, so is their severity and brutality. For 
example, estimated fatalities totaled over just three genocides (Cambodia 1975−9, Pakistan 1971, 
and Sudan 1983−2002; total: ~6,837,000 people) far surpass the total estimated battle-related 
fatalities for all of the 347 intrastate wars fought from 1900–2015 (total: ~4,893,230 people; see 
Appendix). Indeed, six of the mass atrocities plotted in Figure 1 each have a MALOS score 
greater than the combined score for the aggregate of all battle-related fatalities for the 347 
intrastate wars.
9
 The brutality of mass atrocities lies not only in who is being destroyed, and in 
what numbers, but in how people are destroyed. Atrocity survivors often report physical and 
mental torture prior to “mere” killing (for example, child dismemberment in front of parents or 
insertion of vermin through tubes into people’s intestines). 
The data shown in Figure 1 raise questions about a dominant theme in the literature, namely, 
that mass atrocity is primarily “death by government” (Rummel, 1994; Pinker, 2011). In terms of 
events, Figure 1 documents 36 mass atrocities perpetrated by states, 1989–2017. Yet during the 
same time span, an additional 39 mass atrocities were perpetrated by nonstate actors (many 
acting independently), and in particular by rebel and militia groups (see Appendix). Regarding 
fatalities from 1989–2017, however, government mass atrocities have been more deadly (~ 1.9 
million fatalities) than nonstate cases (~ 250,000). Regarding data on “low-level” violence 
                                                                                                                                                                           
displaced people (IDPs) and refugees can number in the many millions of people per conflict, for example, in 
Colombia and Syria. For a review of studies on sexual violence and associated mental trauma and social 
consequences, 1981–2014, see Ba and Bhopal (2017). 
9
 The six are: China (onset 1925, MALOS=7.0), USSR (onset 1930, MALOS=6.81), USSR (onset 1932, 
MALOS=6.78), Germany (onset 1933, MALOS=7.0), Japan (onset 1935, MALOS=6.71), and China (onset 1949, 
MALOS=7.55). Note that the log scale obscures the difference between the smallest and the largest values (6.71; 
7.55); the small log-difference of 0.84 translates into an extra 30 million deaths! 
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against civilians (VAC) in Africa (not shown in Figure 1), ACLED reports 47,835 VAC events, 
excluding riots, protests, and peacekeeping missions, and 178,397 associated fatalities from 1997 
to December 15, 2018 (Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, and Karlsen, 2010).
10
 Among perpetrator 
categories, state forces (military and/or police) carried out 20.2 percent of VAC attacks and were 
responsible for 16.5 percent of the fatalities. The very large remainder is accounted for by other 
actors. (Rebel forces accounted for 19.6 percent of attacks, but 37.0 percent of fatalities, political 
and identity militias for 29.7 percent of attacks and 30.1 percent of fatalities,
11
 and unidentified 
perpetrators for 30.5 percent and 15.8 percent, respectively). For “low-level” violence, then, 
“death by government” may not be as prominent a feature. 
A final point: At times the literature conflates mass atrocities with periods of war. This is not 
necessarily correct. For example, of the 138 mass atrocity cases for which onset years for both, 
wars and mass atrocities are available, 20 percent had no overlap years with a war period at all. 
Of the remaining 80 percent, one-third of the cases began in a year before war onset and then 
continued into the war period, another third had the same onset year as a war so that it is unclear 
whether mass atrocity or war came first in that year, and only 30 percent occurred after the onset 
year of a war (see Appendix).  
In sum, mass atrocities encompass far are more than genocides and involve more than 
“mere” killing. States need not be the primary atrocity perpetrators. Even when limited to the 
1,000+ people killed cases depicted in Figure 1, cases are frequent, fairly evenly distributed 
across time, occur in wartime and in peacetime, and lead to an enormous number of victims.  
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with zero fatalities. Zero fatality events should be important in atrocity research because they would include forced 
abductions, non-fatal rapes and beatings, destruction of cultural goods, and stealing of land and other goods. 
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3. Actors and Their Choices: Theory 
This section discusses four sets of economic theories that contribute to the study of mass 
atrocities. These are standard theory’s core of rational choice and game-theoretic approaches as 
well as some theory of the firm considerations (Section 3.1), behavioral and identity economics 
in regard to nonstandard decisionmaking, beliefs, and preferences (3.2), social network 
economics and analysis of complex adaptive systems (3.3), and aspects of political economy 
(3.4). These tributaries intertwine; works cited in one section might well have been placed in 
another. We survey relevant literature, highlight contributions of particular interest, and conclude 
with an evaluation of the extant material (Section 3.5) before turning to empirical matters in 
Section 4.  
3.1 Tributary 1: Standard theory 
3.1.1 Rational choice theory 
Lionel Robbins argued that “any kind of human behavior falls within the scope of economic 
generalisations” (1937, p. 16). This includes war—of which Robbins made a special point—
peace, and, in our case, mass atrocities or their absence. This is so because in Robbins’ choice-
theoretic view even a dictator bent on group removal has to choose how best to deploy scarce 
means to pursue desired ends (Robbins, 1937; Fein, 1979; Valentino, 2004). Standard theory 
does not interrogate preferences (Stigler and Becker, 1977) but studies how the fulfillment of 
given, subjective preferences is objectively constrained by the resources needed to defray the 
expense of obtaining the ends. If, given the resources, killing costs “too much” and thereby limits 
acquisition of other preferred (nonkilling) goods, then killing may not take place. Similarly if, 
given the prices of killing and nonkilling, resources are too few then, again, killing may not be 
chosen. Thus, behavior is subject to the constraint of scarce means. Even if the dictator already 
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has decided on some amount of killing, Robbins’ view comes into play. If, given available 
resources, mass killing by shooting is “too costly” relative to killing in gas chambers, then killing 
in gas chambers it is. Either way, in standard theory the “problem” of mass atrocity becomes one 
of a general class of mathematical problems called constrained optimization. So long as 
preferences are given and consistent (complete, transitive, context independent), the dictator is 
said to act rationally—not in regard to the content of his preferences, of course, but in the way he 
goes about seeing them fulfilled (Wintrobe, 2007). 
 Ignoring for now the why of mass atrocity, this way of studying them can yield insights into 
their decisionmaking mechanics, offer predictions and testable hypotheses, and suggest what it 
may take to mitigate, or altogether prevent, them. For example, Anderton and Brauer (2016) use 
Lancaster’s (1966) input attributes model to analyze the many input possibilities available to a 
group pursuing mass atrocity.
12
 Their work reveals that protection efforts to constrain an elite’s 
use of one or several of the destruction inputs may have relatively little effect, and sometimes no 
effect, in protecting the targeted group. Under such circumstances, protection policy cannot 
focus on just one or several inputs available to mass atrocity architects. To be effective, 
prevention requires holistic policies, raising the unit costs of virtually all inputs (or lowering 
their productivity), reducing resources available for mass destruction, or altering the preference 
set of the ruling elite altogether so that mass atrocity is not utility-enhancing—a result readily 
available in the counterterrorism literature as well (Landes, 1978; Enders and Sandler, 2011). 
Lancaster’s model can also be used to analyze the role of any one key input for achieving a 
particular form of mass repression such as ideological control of substantial numbers of people. 
For example, Stalin’s mass resettlement of millions of people was designed, in part, to keep 
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 See Semelin (2007, pp. 233-6) for documentation of wide-ranging “mass killing technologies,” including those 
deployed during colonial conquests in Africa in the nineteenth century and in the Ottoman Empire, Germany, 
Poland, Bosnia, and Rwanda in the twentieth century. 
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regime opposition weak, but this was keenly dependent on transportation networks. Geocoding 
some 2.65 million arrest records overlaid on railroad maps, Zhukov (2016) provides empirical 
evidence that Stalin obeyed the law of demand during the regime’s population control campaigns 
over the period 1945–59. Specifically, all else equal, because of the higher cost, Stalin was less 
willing to coerce more remotely located civilians to move. The further away they lived from a 
railway station and the greater the distance to a forced labor camp (Gulag), the higher the 
likelihood that they received other sentences such as incarceration or property confiscation. 
 As this example shows, the constrained optimization model can be applied to mass atrocity 
as a means to an end.
13
 Assume a production function in which mass killing of civilians is one of 
the inputs for achieving political or territorial control and the ruling elite is resource-constrained. 
Such models generally show that mass killing acts will occur when they are “cheap” and 
productive at the margin relative to other means of achieving control such as directly contesting 
rebels (Anderton, 2014a; Anderton and Brauer, 2016). Such models imply a downward-sloping 
demand function for mass atrocity in which the higher the per-unit cost of people-group 
destruction, the lower the amount of mass atrocity actions demanded. Again, Zhukov (2016) 
provides empirical evidence for such behavior. Specifically, using 80,000 geocoded events, he 
finds that the number of acts of violence against civilians by governments and rebels in Africa 
over the period 1997–2010 are greater, the lower are the logistical costs of such acts (due to high 
road density and distance from a country’s capital city), all else equal. Furthermore, Anderton 
and Ryan (2016) use a Cobb-Douglas production function, Stone-Geary utility function, and 
concepts from the rational addiction literature to derive a demand function for atrocity in which 
lower-level attacks in period t lead to high-level attacks in period t + 1 owing to a habituation 
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 While constrained optimization models have been applied to mass atrocity architects, 
virtually no such models have been applied to other actors such as “troop” perpetrators, 
bystanders, or victims (Brauer and Anderton, 2014). Brauer and Caruso (2016) provide guidance 
for how this work can unfold with applications to five pre-Holocaust genocides. Such work may 
help to explain behavior that currently seems incomprehensible. For example, extremely brutal 
means of destruction (rape, torture, forced killing of family members) can be instrumentally 
rational (von Joeden-Forgey, 2016), demonization and dehumanization making killing 
psychologically less costly or “burdensome” to the perpetrators (Pinker, 2011). In some cases, 
the threat of brutal killing can be financially rewarding when, for example, some victims of the 
1994 Rwandan genocide paid their killers to shoot them instead of hacking them to death with 
machetes (des Forges, 1999, p. 216). The approach may also help explain seemingly puzzling 
actions of agents in mass atrocity contexts, for example, the aforementioned outcome in which 
an agent acts as both perpetrator and rescuer (the “utility” of killing a perceived foe as opposed 
to the “disutility” of killing a friend). Recognizing the role of price and resource constraints, 
economists are particularly well-equipped to interrogate the ‘how’ of mass atrocities and to 
elucidate their mechanics, possibly leading to fresh insights into intervention, mitigation, or 
prevention. 
3.1.2 Classic game theory  
By taking account of strategic interdependence among actors, classic (as distinct from 
evolutionary) game theory models of mass atrocity are an extension of rational choice and 
decision theory. Literature often points to strategic aspects of mass killings.
14
 Perpetrators could 
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 Kalyvas (1999, 2006), Valentino (2004), Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004), Meierhenrich (2014, p. 21), 
Waller (2016, pp. 214–5). 
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intentionally mass kill civilians for a variety of reasons including to eliminate a threat to the 
elite’s ideological or physical control of the state, to undermine civilian support for a rebel group 
contesting the elite, to create terror and thus subservience among the population, and to eliminate 
a rival group once and for all. Of course, nonstate groups may also mass kill civilians for similar 
reasons (Wood, 2010; Eck, 2015; Ottmann, 2015; Vargas, 2016). Most game theory models of 
mass atrocity posit a ruling authority contesting a potential or actual rebel group in which 
civilians can be manipulated (for example, repressed, forcibly relocated, or killed) by one or both 




 An important model along these lines is Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner (2015, hereafter EMR) 
who consider two potentially warring groups with distinct initial populations, one of which is in 
power. In each period of an infinite horizon game, a divisible surplus is available, generated from 
a per-period exploitable natural resource and output produced by labor drawn from the two 
populations according to a labor productivity parameter. At the beginning of period t, production 
occurs, and the group in power announces the division of surplus based on a fairness parameter, 
which may be bound from below based on domestic and international norms. The two groups 
then decide whether to fight, with both needing to choose peace for peace to prevail. If war 
occurs, a portion of the surplus is lost. The winner retains (or obtains) power, keeps the 
remaining surplus, and decides whether and how many to mass kill from the other group, a factor 
which may be bound from above based on international norms. 
 In the model, the fundamental tradeoff that determines the decision to mass kill is between 
the gains and costs of group elimination for the winner following war. Gains include the 
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substantial control of discounted future streams of the surplus and a weakening of the other 
group, which could prove beneficial in the event of future violence. Costs involve the loss in 
discounted future streams of production in labor-intensive sectors owing to elimination of part of 
the population. The game permits multiple subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) and, even though 
equilibria without violence exist, EMR show that the surplus-maximizing SPE can display war 
and mass killing.
16
 Hence, one cannot necessarily escape the mass killing result by coordinating 
onto a surplus-maximizing equilibrium. This is a disturbing result. 
 Comparative static predictions of the EMR model are important. Tweak any parameter in the 
model, and the bargaining space can shrink, making the commitment problem more urgent. 
Thus, war and mass killing are most likely to occur when natural resources are relatively more 
important than people in producing surplus. And since people consume surplus, cutting down on 
their numbers can result in the tragic economic logic that lay behind Nazi-era Germany’s 
schemes to work to death and destroy “useless eaters” (Browning, 2004, p. 295).
17
 Also 
noteworthy are the “backfire” results that emerge from the EMR model. In contrast to an 
unrestricted upper bound, new norms that tighten the constraints on an actor’s power to mass kill 
can increase killing incentives as a smaller future surviving population of “others” may be 
desirable from the perpetrators’ perspective. Similarly, if domestic or international actors insist 
on more stringent fairness norms in surplus division by the group in power, incentives to mass 
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player B to prevent the future possibility that player A is eliminated. Even in the version of the model where there 
are limits to the exercise of power, a commitment problem still exists. Specifically, any player in power today (say 
A) will, under certain parametric conditions, want to weaken player B to diminsh the potential that player A is 
weakened in the future. For applications of the bargaining theory of war to a variety of commitment problems in 
mass atrocity contexts, see Anderton (2010, pp. 465-73). In the civil war literature, exploration of the commitment 
problems is much more developed (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). 
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 German expansion to the east through Poland and into Russia from September 1939 to March 1942 eventually led 
to conquests of areas with little or no industry. “Since fewer workers were needed for economic purposes, the 




kill can increase as the group in power will not gain a large enough share of the surplus to make 
peace and the avoidance of mass killing worthwhile.  
 In contrast to literature that focuses on strategic wrangling between a ruling and a potential or 
actual rebel group, Vargas (2016) considers interdependencies among nonpassive victims and 
two groups of combatants who contest control of territory. The probability that a group secures 
territorial control is a function of the size of its civilian support network. The probability that a 
civilian is killed by one group given her support of the other is determined by a Tullock-like 
contest success function encompassing the fighting efforts and effectiveness parameters of the 
armed groups (Tullock, 1975, 1980). Armed groups simultaneously choose their fighting effort 
to maximize their civilian support network. This, in turn, maximizes their probability of winning 
the contested territory. Civilians, meanwhile, strategically choose which group (or none) to 
support. In supporting one group, heterogeneous individuals incorporate in their utility functions 
the probability of being killed by the other group and also an idiosyncratic parameter reflecting 
each civilian’s bias toward supporting a group. A perfect-information sequential game is solved 
by backward induction, beginning in stage 2 with each armed group choosing its fighting effort 
to maximize its payoff. The resulting best-response functions lead to equilibrium fighting efforts. 
Backing up to the first stage, each civilian takes the equilibrium fighting efforts of the armed 
groups into account to determine her or his probability of being killed by one group when 
supporting the other. Given the distribution of bias parameters across civilians, the equilibrium 
number of civilians compliant with each armed group is determined.  
 We emphasize three of the model’s results. First, noncombatants are strategically killed by 
both sides in the contest, a result frequently observed in reality. Second, owing to a preference 
for survival, it can be extremely difficult for civilians to resist supporting armed groups or to 
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remain neutral when combatants are willing to conduct atrocities. Moreover, as their utility 
calculus changes, civilians can change the side they support, as again is frequently observed. 
Survival trumps loyalty. Third, the model applies to civilians unable to flee the violence (called 
“stayers” in Ibáñez and Moya, 2016), a generally underresearched topic in the field. 
 Other than DeMeritt (2015a, 2015b), we are unaware of formal models of principal-agent 
games between governments and subcontracted militia groups or between external actors and 
rebel groups in which civilians are at risk of mass atrocity (but see Eck, 2015; Salehyan, Siroky, 
and Wood, 2014, for empirical treatments). Furthermore, there are few formal models of 
strategic interactions among perpetrators, bystanders, and victims (but see evolutionary models 
in Section 3.4) or of strategic aspects of refugee outcomes (for exceptions, see Zeager and 
Bascom, 1996; Zeager, 1998, 2002, 2005). In addition, scholars have raised the possibility of 
moral hazard associated with bystander interventions. For example, a rebel group could 
strategically goad a government into mass killing so as to induce bystander intervention 
(Kuperman and Crawford, 2006; Kuperman, 2008; Kydd and Straus, 2013). We take up 
intervention in the empirical section below. Developments in the theory of dictatorship also point 
to important implications for mass atrocities (Wintrobe, 1990, 1998, 2007; Verwimp, 2003a), 
again addressed later on. 
3.1.3 Theory of the firm 
Mass destruction requires the acquisition of inputs from and delivery of destruction to potentially 
many locales. But the nature of atrocity production varies across cases, for example, in the Nazi-
era Holocaust from high capital intensity, strong complicity of numerous firms, and 
geographically widespread tentacles of destruction, on the one hand, to the high labor intensity, 
relatively little direct business complicity, and more localized deaths in the Rwandan genocide, 
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on the other hand. Regardless of the variance across cases, principles of managerial economics, 
industrial organization, and economics of information (propaganda) apply.
18
 A key contribution 
is Breton and Wintrobe (1986), who explain how Nazi bureaucracy (encompassing leaders, 
agencies, bureaus, and firms) became such a monumental industry of mass killing.
 19
 The static 
model of bureaucracy assumes that bureaus have given assignments in which they are 
monopolists over their assigned areas but Breton and Wintrobe (1986) insist that the Holocaust 
“cannot be understood by using such a model of bureaucracy” (p. 909). Instead, superiors and 
subordinates traded with each other through “informal services” and “informal payments” (p. 
909), and bureaus competed with one another for jobs, resources, and the generation of new 
ideas, policies, and projects to please Hitler and other Nazi leaders. The key insight is that Hitler 
fostered a tournament-like “Schumpeterian competition or entrepreneurship” among bureaus 
toward people-group destruction (Breton and Wintrobe, 1986, p. 909), a rent-seeking contest. 
Within this dynamic world of new ideas and programs, “schemes [to destroy Jews] were 
constantly being put forward by rival power centers or rival entrepreneurs, and Hitler would 
choose among them” (Breton and Wintrobe, 1986, p. 912). 
 Breton and Wintrobe (1986) provide important insights. We emphasize two. The first 
concerns the notion of efficiency. Some scholars cite the frightening efficiency of the Holocaust; 
others emphasize its inefficiencies. Thus, Stokes and Gabriel (2010, p. 465–6) quote Grey (2005) 
on the idea that the Nazi’s industrial organization and bureaucratic systems of rules made 
genocide “as technically efficient as genocide could be” but also quote Bauer (2001) for whom 
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 Institutional and bureacratic cooption into mass killing is documented in many mass atrocity case studies. See, for 
example, Suny (2015) on the Armenian genocide during World War I, Conquest (1986) on Soviet-created famine in 
the Ukraine in the early 1930s, Su (2011) on mass killings during China’s cultural revolution of the 1960s–70s, 
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Kurdistan, and Straus (2006) on the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 
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the Nazi bureaucracy was “often a fumbling, ineffective, contradiction-ridden machine.” Breton 
and Wintrobe (1986) make a different argument: If Hitler and other key leaders created a messy 
cauldron of bureaus and businesses with overlapping interests and claims, the unleashed 
dynamism would do far more to mass-destroy people than rearranging a static flowchart of 
organizational responsibilities could ever do.  
 Second, Breton and Wintrobe’s work speaks to shortcomings in the literature on the dark side 
of organizations, including economic theories of organizations.
20
 The literature recognizes that 
organizations can make mistakes, harbor misconduct, encourage opportunistic behavior among 
its divisions, and appeals to cognitive gaps in leadership and to groups, ideology, and peer 
pressure to explain how organizations can end up on a slippery slope toward disaster, but such 
going awry is generally treated as unintended. What is missing is the intentional creation of 
misconduct and disaster as one finds in Breton and Wintrobe (1986). This is no small distinction. 
In the “dark side” literature, information erroneously becomes incomplete; in the Nazi 
bureaucracy, incomplete information is purposely fostered because it aids in the entrepreneurship 
of destruction. As Breton and Wintrobe (1986, p. 914) note, “another indicator of competition 
among bureaus in the Nazi state is the imprecision of the orders emanating from the top. When 
orders do not have specific content and when they are not directed at anyone in particular, they 
will elicit a large response from diverse quarters” (our emphasis). 
 Moreover, the dark side literature is not nearly dark enough. In the economics of people-
group destruction, the harsh economic rationalizations are almost unfathomable. For example, in 
accounting documents that survived the Holocaust, prisoners who were worked to death 
generated a profit stream and then a “scrap value” after they died encompassing their clothing, 
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valuables (including extracted fillings), hair (for soap), and ashes (for fertilizer) (Lippman and 
Wilson, 2007, p. 288). As the war progressed, resource shortages affected Nazi techniques of 
destruction and cost-benefit analysis was used to optimize the killing routines. For example, 
analysis showed that people could be killed with less gas if they were made to die longer (15 to 
20 minutes) rather than shorter (7 minutes). Hence, victims were made to suffer longer, because 
it lowered the cost of going about the dark business (Lippman and Wilson, 2007, p. 290). 
Similarly, children could be gassed and then burned after they were dead, but it was cheaper to 
burn them alive, and so they were (Lippman and Wilson, 2007, p. 289).  
3.2 Tributary 2: Behavioral and identity economics 
Beyond the ‘how’ of mass atrocity lies the question of ‘why’. Behavioral and identity 
economics—confluences of psychology, sociology, and economics—can address aspects of both. 
Differentiated from standard theory in three ways—nonstandard decisionmaking, nonstandard 
beliefs, and nonstandard preferences (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Rabin, 2002; DellaVigna, 
2009) —we illustrate each in turn.  
3.2.1 Nonstandard decisionmaking 
Decisionmaking in standard theory does not always match decisionmaking observed in practice 
(Allais, 1953; Simon, 1955). Consider, for example, decision framing and emotion in the context 
of mass atrocity intervention. Slovic, et al. (2016, p. 613–4) write that the “repetitiveness of 
[mass] atrocities, which too often have been ignored by powerful people and nations and by the 
general public, calls for an explanation that may reflect some fundamental deficiency in our 
humanity” (our emphasis). One of these concerns framing. Emotional framing by “othering” an 
out-group is a precondition for mass atrocity to occur (Stanton, 2013).
21
 Many mass atrocities are 
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Sadrieh, 2009; Pinker, 2011, ch. 8). 
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well-reported, even in their earliest stages, yet decisionmakers often hesitate to intervene 
decisively. Part of this, for instance at the level of the UN Security Council, is due to political 
wrangling, but another part is due to a decision frame that elevates such wrangling above 
humanitarian instincts. Even when these instincts remain intact, decisionmakers are subject to 
psychophysical numbing and compassion fade: Pouring over data, tables, charts, and analyses—a 
statistical frame—dulls the mind and it can become difficult to process the numbers affectively. 
Thus, Slovic, et al. (2016) recommend the use of affective tools to reframe decisionmakers’ 
mindsets so as to “employ intuitive thinking to activate and support deliberative processes” (p. 
630), for example affective imagery or meeting atrocity victims in person. Statistics of abuse 
remain important, to be sure, but “storytelling” can help lay the groundwork for their absorption.  
 To select a second example, contrary to the assumption in standard theory that humans pay 
full attention to all relevant information and base decisionmaking on its unbiased processing, 
humans in fact are less than fully attentive and they struggle to process information. Moreover, 
attention is subject to salience and the number of competing stimuli faced. To cope, people 
employ decision heuristics (Simon, 1955). Further, due to the presence of prior beliefs, people 
are not always rationally neutral in regard to information received and this can bias even their 
inattention and result in suboptimal decision heuristics (DellaVigna, 2009). Slovic, et al. (2016) 
once more provide an example. While psychophysical numbing and compassion fade can help 
explain why decisionmakers fail to intervene with sufficient urgency in some mass atrocities, in 
others they may be quite aware of a situation and yet still fail to act adequately. What may help 
explain this is that decisionmakers rarely have a single issue to decide or, alternatively, that even 
single issues are comprised of multiple decisionmaking dimensions such as diplomatic, military, 
political, economic, and cultural. Unlike standard theory, which assumes that choices made 
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correspond to a decisionmaker’s expressed values, the prominence effect states that choices are 
made on a number of weighted criteria, and the more important or salient of these (the 
“prominent” ones) most influence the final decision made. One reason is that “unlike expressed 
values, chosen actions need to be justified, and decisions congruent with prominent attributes are 
inherently more defensible” (p. 622). Thus, actual decisionmaking—often the lack of 
intervention in ongoing mass atrocities—can systematically differ from what would be expected 
on the basis of standard theory but can well be illuminated with an approach grounded in 
behavioral economics. 
3.2.2 Nonstandard beliefs 
Atrocity victims often believe a situation to be not all that dangerous, arguing that still there is 
time for change, that others will come to one’s assistance, or that opportunities to escape will 
exist (see the numerous eyewitness accounts recorded in Totten and Parsons, 2018). Striking 
examples of this are provided by the families of Raphael Lemkin and Hersh Lauterpacht, 
respectively the originators of the legal concepts of genocide and of crimes against humanity 
(Sands, 2016). For example, Lemkin, a Polish Jew, fled in September 1939 owing in part to his 
belief that Nazi-Germany was going to unleash ever greater atrocities against Jewish people. 
Pleas made to many of his relatives that they, too, must flee were met with expressions like: 
“There is nothing new in the suffering of the Jews, especially in time of war … A Jew must wait 
and pray” (quoted in Power, 2002, p. 24). Tragically, 49 of Lemkin’s relatives perished during 
the Holocaust (Bartrop and Leonard, 2014, pp. 1301–2). Standard theory—with its assumption 
that individuals have unbiased, that is, on average correct, beliefs about the state of the world—
cannot fully explain victims’ hesitant behavior. In contrast, nonstandard beliefs reflect empirical 
phenomena such as victim overconfidence (for example in ability, information, and opportunity) 
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and bias in projecting one’s current state, preferences, and beliefs into the future.  
 A relatively new research area, highly relevant to mass atrocities, is motivated reasoning and 
beliefs. Ariely (2013) for instance summarizes empirical literature showing that individuals act 
self-interestedly when given the opportunity to appear to act altruistically, or else that they 
delegate decisionmaking to others such that their own altruistic moral beliefs are upheld even as 
the delegate makes decisions in the self-interest of the delegator. Individuals place value on 
feeling moral rather than necessarily on being moral. Gino, Norton, and Weber (2016) quote an 
engineer whose work at J.A. Topf & Söhne included designing more efficient incineration 
facilities (cremation ovens and ventilation systems) for use in Nazi-era extermination camps: “I 
was a German engineer and key member of the Topf works, and I saw it as my duty to apply my 
specialist knowledge in this way to help Germany win the war ...” (2016, p. 190). The expressed 
preference (“I saw it as my duty”) is bent toward biased beliefs about one’s own good moral 
standing rather than about a “preference for morality itself” (p. 191). Whereas in standard theory 
individuals are “classical Bayesians [who] will seek out the most informative evidence and 
process it in an unbiased way, motivated Bayesians will also be influenced by the evidence that 
they encounter but will be biased both in choosing which information to acquire and in their 
interpretation of such information in order to facilitate beliefs in their own morality” (p. 191). 
Motived to “protect the psychological self” (Staub, 1989, p. 39), individuals form self-serving 
judgments of what is, or is not, moral, fair, or just and they alter judgments about situations’ 
objective qualities to make self-interested behavior appear more moral than otherwise. 
 Bénabou and Tirole (2011, 2016) develop a model that stipulates beliefs as assets. In 
particular, they posit that people invest in their own identity, hoping that the value of this 
investment will grow over time and yield appropriate returns (an accumulation of, and dividends 
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from status, reputation, and life satisfaction). Such investment is worth protecting in the face of 
challenges. Bénabou and Tirole describe their work as “based on a general model of identity 
management” (2011, p. 806), the mathematical details of which show escalating commitment to 
beliefs even to the point where the marginal returns no longer justify continual investment 
(treadmill effects), the point at which standard theory suggests to shift additional investments 
into alternative assets. Challenges to one’s identity must be dealt with, eventually by rejecting 
competing identities. Belief coherence becomes important, as do self-signaling, self-validation, 
self-reputation, and endowment effects. Individuals become their own reference point. Escalating 
commitment and treadmill effects can lead to the persistence and stubbornness often found in 
fanaticism and go some way toward explaining the why, or at least the continuance, of mass 
atrocities by perpetrators. In contrast to prior literature, Bénabou and Tirole (2011) endogenize 
the process of identity management. Beliefs face tradeoffs between accuracy and desirability, 
tradeoffs that can lead to “non-Bayesian behaviors such as not wanting to know, wishful 
thinking, and reality denial” even as “motivated beliefs will respond to the costs, benefits, and 
stakes involved in maintaining different self-views and world-views” (Bénabou and Tirole, 2016, 
p. 142; emphases suppressed). 
 Epley and Gilovich (2016) turn to the mechanics of motivated reasoning in the service of 
belief formation and protection. In a nice analogy, they write that “most people do not reason 
like impartial judges, but instead recruit evidence like attorneys, looking for evidence that 
supports a desired belief while trying to steer clear of evidence that refutes it” (p. 136). Biased 
information processing (here, confirmation bias) is associated with asymmetries: When 
potentially favorable, belief-supporting information comes along, people tend to ask: “Can I 
believe this?” When potentially unfavorable, belief-challenging information comes along, people 
30 
 
tend to ask: “Must I believe this?” (p. 136). The first question asks for no more than one fact to 
support the belief; the second asks for no more than one nonsupporting fact to dismiss the 
challenge. Thus, evidence needed to successfully challenge a belief is greater than that needed to 
maintain a belief and this can make it hard to dislodge people’s minds from an entrenched, 
habitual way of thinking and acting. For mass atrocities, these sorts of motivated belief 
mechanics are at work for all the players involved, perpetrators, bystanders, and victims (Staub, 
1985, 1993; Hilberg, 1992; Power, 2002; Waller, 2007).  
 Individuals also take care to manage what they believe other people believe about them. 
Belief management is driven by a preference for belief consonance and can partly explain actions 
such as attempting to alter the beliefs of others or else belief modification to conform one’s own 
beliefs to those of others. Golman, et al.’s (2016) reading of the empirical evidence suggests that 
a preference for belief consonance can help explain the “deadliest varieties” of interpersonal and 
intergroup conflict (p. 165) and, especially, “the curious fact that many of the most vicious 
disputes occur between individuals or groups who share a broad set of beliefs (consider Shiites 
and Sunnis or Catholics and Protestants) and revolve around differences in beliefs that can seem 
minor from the perspectives of outsiders to the conflict” (p. 166). 
 Nonstandard beliefs are relevant to the topic of mass atrocities, then. Especially important is 
the idea that individuals “will respond” when tradeoffs related to beliefs are altered or when 
there are changes in the political, economic, or cultural environment within which tradeoff 
choices are made. Such alterations in tradeoffs related to beliefs are reported in virtually all case 
studies of mass atrocity.
22
 Equally important is the idea that nonstandard beliefs can become a 
social phenomenon (Bénabou and Tirole, 2016, p. 142), an idea we explore in Section 3.3. 
3.2.3 Nonstandard preferences 
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One can think of nonstandard preferences in two ways. One introduces cognitive biases and 
other psychological phenomena into utility functions. This is the behavioral economics approach. 
The other brings in social context as well. This is the identity economics approach.  
Start with the behavioral approach and consider two examples from the mass atrocity case 
study literature. The first is the sense of hyper-urgency that atrocity architects and perpetrators 
often display in carrying out acts of violence. Dunn, for example, reports that in the “very first 
days” of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in December 1975, “an orgy of indiscriminate 
killing, rape, and torture” as well as “large-scale public executions” took place (2013, p. 286). 
Similar reports of sudden (within a few days) and substantial outbreaks of mass atrocity have 
been reported for Rwanda in 1994 (Lemarchand, 2009, p. 492), Pakistan’s attack against 
Bangladesh in 1971 (Jahan, 2009, p. 302), and Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939 
(Browning, 2004, pp. 12–35). How to explain this urgency? Whereas standard expected utility 
theory assumes time-consistent discounting of the value of future utility to the present, laboratory 
and field data show that humans engage in time-inconsistent, hyperbolic discounting: As if 
viewed through a faulty telescope, the present appears disproportionately engorged (Thaler, 
2016, pp. 92–3). Favoring present gratification, when deferred gratification may be the more 
rational course of action to take, reflects lack of self-control, literally a “de-ranged” sense of 
time, which in the case of mass atrocities can express itself in “orgies” of large-scale initial 
killing.  
 A second example concerns how atrocity architects deal with loss, or fear of loss. Frequently, 
they “dig in” to maintain their position (status quo bias) even if it were rational to change it, for 
instance, to surrender in the face of sure defeat or otherwise to negotiate an outcome superior to 
the one they are likely to experience in the absence of negotiation. Standard theory does not 
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allow for this kind of nonrational behavior. But suppose utility depends not only on the absolute 
value of one’s expected state of the world but also on differences of that value relative to a 
reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). As an empirical regularity, relative to that 
anchor, humans tend to weigh the prospect of a loss more heavily than the prospect of an 
equivalent gain. Applied to mass atrocities, Anderton and Brauer (2016) then show that reference 
dependence and loss aversion can help explain why an atrocity committing dictator may be 
intransigent and be harder to dislodge from a taken position than standard theory would predict. 
Relatedly, Midlarsky (2005, pp. 104–7, 135–53) appeals to reference dependence and loss 
aversion to help explain the rise of Nazi-era war and genocidal ideologies leading into World 
War II, tracing their emergence in the 1930s in part to drastic German losses in territory, power, 
and resources following World War I (see also Staub, 1989, pp. 30, 91–4). 
Identity economics takes a different tack. To rehearse the context, (1) people define 
themselves in terms of one or more social categories they choose and/or are assigned to; (2) 
social status inheres in each category; (3) the set of categories determines people’s identity, their 
self-image and sense of belonging; (4) identities, in turn, determine how people behave in 
situations in which they interact with other people; (5) for each situation, people internalize 
behavioral norms that an ideal-type person in each category would deem appropriate to follow 
(this ideal may be prescribed); (6) people learn how they and others in a situation are expected to 
behave (the role each plays); (7) when behavior conforms to the ideal, utility gains occur; and (8) 
as situations, and the composition of social categories present in a situation, change, people 
adopt different frames and adapt their behavior accordingly (they play different roles). This 
captures the fundamental tenet of social psychology: People’s behavior is determined not so 
much by who they are but by where (that is, with whom) they are. Behavior is situational more 
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than it is dispositional, and identity is one way in which people frame the situations they are in or 
are put into. Unlike in standard theory, utility functions are situation-dependent and change when 
the norms underlying social categories and situations change. 
Identity is important in economics (Smith, 1759; Boulding, 1956; Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000), and the observation that individuals who identify with each other and cluster into groups 
of like-minded individuals can benefit society at large has led to a revival of the longstanding 
notion of social capital (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993, 1995; Becker and Murphy, 2001; 
Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005). Yet social capital can become antisocial capital as identity-based 
groups that include people can also exclude them (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
23
 Beyond 
exclusion, Sen writes that “identity can also kill—and kill with abandon,” and more so when 
“violence is fomented by the imposition of singular and belligerent identities on gullible people, 
championed by proficient artisans of terror” (Sen, 2006, pp. 1–2). Demagogues and dictators are 
good at identity reduction to a binary “us” versus “them.” Technical analyses of how individuals, 
groups, and (at least implicit) networks interact go back to Schelling (1971), but formal analysis 
of agents’ personal identity came to widespread prominence only with a series of papers by 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005, 2008).  
Applying economic methods to identity, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) propose a utility 
function Uj = Uj (aj, a–j, Ij). Suppressing vector notation, in addition to the usual vectors of person 
j’s actions (aj) and other people’s actions (a–j), utility Uj also depends on j’s identity (Ij). Identity 
itself is modeled with an identity function, Ij = Ij (aj, a–j; cj, ej, P). In words, identity is the 
outcome of one’s own and others’ actions, of course, but also—and importantly—of “assigned 
social categories cj” (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, p. 719). Since social status inheres in social 
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categories, “a person assigned a category with higher social status may enjoy an enhanced self-
image” (p. 719) and consequently a higher level of utility. The ej term captures the degree to 
which person j matches the ideal-type of the category, and the ideal-type itself is indicated by a 
set of behavioral prescriptions, P. In standard theory, identity and its determining factors are 
assumed given and unchanging and therefore analytically ignored. Akerlof and Kranton note that 
“because identity is fundamental to behavior, choice of identity may be the most important 
‘economic’ decision people make ... [and] limits on this choice may ... be the most important 
determinant of an individual’s economic well-being” (2000, p. 717). 
Caruso (2016) contains a direct application to Germany, 1933–45. National identity and its 
manipulation for political ends, combined with confirmation and status quo biases, can lead to a 
self-reinforcing mechanism in which selective uptake of news increases one’s level of utility 
even as society as a whole goes astray. Like Breton and Wintrobe (1986), Caruso notes the 
division of labor in the diffusion of responsibility for the totality of the horrible acts agents 
commit. Cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) arising from the clash of agents’ actions with 
their moral sentiments (Smith, 1759) was managed, Caruso argues, by engineering moral 
disengagement from the effects perpetrators’ acts had on victims. He writes: “Crucial to the 
facilitation of large-scale moral disengagement was a hierarchical organizational structure based 
on the diffusion of responsibility” (p. 323). In this, he also adapts extended work by Akerlof and 
Kranton (2005, 2008) on additional, intermediary actors, for example, in our context, street block 
leaders positioned between ideologues and citizens, commanders between leaders and soldiers, 
or mid-level bureaucrats sandwiched between officials in super- and subordinate bureaus. The 
introduction of additional actors (“supervisors”) then creates new tradeoffs.
24
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In Caruso’s formal adaptation of Akerlof and Kranton’s concepts to the Holocaust, he shows 
that the addition of identity to a model of individual choice (for an insider to participate with 
either high or low effort in mass atrocity) allows the perpetrating nation to get away with 
offering lower pecuniary rewards to the insider than predicted by standard theory. As Caruso 
(2016, p. 321) writes: “true Nazi individuals exert a high level of effort irrespective of monetary 
incentive.” Monetary earnings and identity can become substitutes, with the added benefit of 
relaxing the ideologue’s budget constraint. (In a model with more than two effort levels, earnings 
and identity can be complements.) Important here is that identity can be manipulated by 
changing a citizen’s self-perception, more so when a citizen or group of citizens can be isolated, 
that is, when their situation can be manipulated as well. Insider–outsider concepts readily apply 
(for example in regard to nationality and ethnicity) and lend themselves to identity-reducing “us” 
versus “them” thinking. Investing in defining and designing prescriptions of identity ideal-types 
and thus investing in identity (re)formation are prominent phenomena in virtually all mass 
atrocities. Indeed, the branding of others is the first of Stanton’s (2013) ten stages of genocide. 
Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2016) also pick up on Akerlof and Kranton’s ideas on identity but, 
following Sen (2006), introduce a multiple-identity utility function wherein an individual’s total 
utility derives from two source utilities. The first is tied to an affiliation with a principal group 
with which the individual identifies; the second is tied to one or more other identities of 
importance to the individual as determined by a vector of factors relevant to this individual. The 
first is “like a club good,” the second “similar to a private good” (p. 501).
25
 The principal group-
                                                                                                                                                                           
administration of power” (p. 217) of which The Great Leap Forward and subsequent Cultural Revolution in Mao’s 
China might be examples. Moreover, the paper shows how power can go awry even in nonautocratic organizations. 
This might apply to the mass atrocities suffered by native populations of Australia, Canada, and the United States 
under nonautocratic governance shared among central, provincial, and local powers. 
25
 Biographies of architects of mass murder, such as political leaders in Germany during the Nazi-era, routinely 
show deep affection for associates and family members even as they orchestrated the killing of other people 
(Browning, 1992; Waller, 2007, pp. 3–8). Within a multiple-identities model, both can increase total utility. 
36 
 
related utility depends on an individual’s own actions, on other people’s actions, and on identity. 
This group-related identity itself is influenced, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), by one’s own 
actions (for example, to frequent one’s own ethnic group’s food markets or worship with one’s 
own group) and by one’s co-ethnic or co-religionists’ actions, but also—crucially—by a Glaeser-
type (2005) hate parameter (μ) that is subject to manipulation by atrocity-seeking agents such as 
in-group elites.  
If a despot succeeds in driving up the value of μ, then one’s identity aligns more closely with 
one’s primary group and perceived errant behavior, even by own-group members, generates 
disutility. It follows that one can then “afford” to inflict counterdeviant measures at greater cost 
to oneself than before: One becomes more willing to retaliate against deviancy, even within the 
in-group. Now, if (as in Glaeser, 2005) μ is viewed as a signal sent by a group leader about 
“others,” then members will need to judge the likely veracity of the signal. Is the leader’s signal 
regarding Muslims true? Is Hutu railing on RTML, a radio station, against Tutsi true? This 
creates search costs to appraise signal veracity. If search costs per message are high or if total 
search costs add up due to the frequency of hate messaging, group members may succumb to the 
message. This drives up identity-based affiliation with one’s own group—a “circling the 
wagons” effect—and prepares members to engage in and bear increased costs of retaliation 
against seeming deviants. Note that hate messaging can be modeled as a coordination device for 
group behavior in genocide (Yanigizawa-Drott, 2014). 
3.3 Tributary 3: Networks and complexity analysis 
Mass atrocities are individually motivated yet aggregate activities of a group, so that beyond 
identity as a psycho-social phenomenon per se it is crucial to develop models “link[ing] 
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individual behavior and group outcomes” (Durlauf and Young, 2001, p. 1).
26
 The next two 
subsections draw on some of the available material and deal with variations of what we call, in 
analogy to DellaVigna (2009), the nonstandard self. First, we look at the relation between 
individuals and groups in social networks (Section 3.3.1). Second, we examine complex social 
systems (3.3.2).  
3.3.1 The nonstandard self: The networked self  
The incorporation of peer interaction effects, participation thresholds, and entire social networks 
into economic analysis has emerged over the last half century as a prominent research field, 
along with questions about how norms emerge, cascade through society, and eventually dissipate 
as other norms arise.
27
 Key questions of network economics—How do networks arise? How does 
a given network structure affect agents’ choices in the network? How do networks evolve? How 
do information, learning, and imitation spread across networks? How do key players affect 
network outcomes? How can networks be manipulated?—matter as much for understanding the 
emergence and spread of norms and network effects in cases of financial contagion, disease 
epidemics, peer effects in education, or the intergenerational transmission of poverty as they do 
for mass atrocities. Already there exist network literatures on crime, conflict and defense, and 
terrorism with obvious parallels to mass atrocity risk and prevention.
28
 Albeit characterized as an 
“ensemble of different scenarios” (Dziubinski, Goyal, and Vigier, 2016, p. 217) with a 
“bewildering array of different (and sometimes even contradictory) results” (Acemoglu, 
Malekian, and Ozdaglar, 2016, p. 570), nevertheless this literature is highly relevant as mass 
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atrocities are crimes perpetrated through social networks on social networks (Lemkin, 1944). For 
example, Feldman and Seibel (2005) emphasize that the Holocaust involved “networks of Nazi 
persecution” and, according to Adalian (2013, p. 126), the “chain of command that put the 
Armenian genocide into motion joined every link in the administration of the Ottoman state.” 
Begin with the canonical participation threshold models of Schelling (1971, 1978) and 
Granovetter (1978). To use Granovetter’s example, will 100 people assembled in a public square 
riot? Suppose player A has a riot participation threshold of zero (a self-acting person), player B 
has a threshold of one (another player needs to riot first), player C of two, and so on up to the 
100th player who has a threshold of 99. Player A may well be ignorant of this frequency 
distribution but, being an instigator, tests the waters and takes a riotous action such as throwing a 
rock through a shop window. This activates B to join, which then activates C, and so on until the 
entire crowd (n=100) riots. The tipping point for the action to diffuse through the crowd consists 
of the first player. Compare this group with another where player B has a threshold of two. Now 
when player A breaks the window, no second player joins the action. The riot, such as it is, 
consists of a lone vandal. Thus, whether and how an observed collective action cascades through 
a crowd depends as much on the aggregation function as on any underlying characteristics 
(attributes, preferences, beliefs, norms) its individual members may possess. This leads to a two-
fold observation. One, as Schelling notes, is that “[i]nferences about individual motives can 
usually not be drawn from aggregate patterns” (1971, p. 143). Every player may have a riotous 
disposition but is waiting for situational clues that may or may not occur. The other is that a 
trivial marginal change in an initial condition—the addition or removal of a single player—can 
lead to significant changes in situational dynamics with dramatic consequences for the final 
outcome, for example whether a newsworthy riot occurs or whether a lone vandal is hauled off 
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by police officers and remains unbeknown to virtually all others. 
Anderton and Brauer (2018) develop a model along these lines in which a village harbors a 
small number of neighbors ill-disposed toward an out-group. They show how under a baseline 
set of initial conditions acceptance of an untoward attitude toward outsiders spreads over time 
and space until the whole village is “infected” with an anti-out-group norm. They then study how 
trivial changes, for example in the initial geographic location of a single instigator or structural 
changes in how village members are connected to each other (the spatial distribution of 
neighbors), can lead to widely divergent outcomes ranging from no acceptance, to partial 
acceptance, to full acceptance throughout the village of antagonistic feelings toward out-group 
members. Moreover, their model shows how the spatial pattern of anti out-group feeling changes 
over time depending of which set of conditions is in place. Even a setup as simple as theirs helps 
address a number of puzzles genocide scholars have noted such as why some villages (societies) 
mass participate in atrocities while other villages (societies) with seemingly similar 
characteristics do not. The model is applicable to a frequently reported phenomenon in mass 
atrocity case studies, namely, contestation among members within an in-group over whether 
atrocities will be inflicted on “others” (for example, Browning, 2004, pp. 15-24; Straus, 2006, p. 
65; Vági, Csȍsz, and Kádár, 2013, pp. lvi-lvii). Straus (2006, p. 65) reports that within some 
Rwandan villages during the genocide a “tipping point was reached; once that happened, mass 
mobilization of Hutu men swiftly followed, with devastating consequences for Tutsis.” The 
contagion mechanisms in the model can be generalized to include contagion of atrocity actions 
across villages, which Straus (2006, p. 93) characterized during the Rwandan genocide as a 
“cascade of tipping points.”  
Jackson (2014) drills more deeply into peer interaction effects. His model can demonstrate 
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how a person whose own norms do not favor—indeed, oppose—genocidal behavior may 
nonetheless engage in such behavior if enough other people do. Explaining such seemingly 
puzzling behavior has vexed genocide writers repeatedly. Drumbl (2016), for instance, quotes 
Victor Frankl (a major writer on the Holocaust experience) who argues that no one, however 
constrained, is ever bereft of agency (p. 224, fn 19), meaning that one’s own agency can always 
override peer effects. In contrast, Drumbl writes of the reality of “tragic perpetrators”— and 
“imperfect victims” compelled to victimize others—who in spite of their own feelings help 
commit atrocities (2016, pp. 218, 245). Jackson (2014) illustrates this tension with a logistic 
equation, log[pi/(1–pi)] = βXi + λFi, where pi is the probability of an individual taking an action, 
Xi is a set of characteristics of the individual (the vector notation is suppressed), and Fi is the 
portion of that individual’s peers (or friends) who also take or are believed to take the action. 
Parameters β and λ capture strengths or “contributions” of the individual’s self-influence relative 
to peer influence.
29
 Standard theory assumes that λ=0, ignoring peer effects and, like Frankl, thus 
exalting individuals’ agency. But the larger is λFi, the larger is the influence of one’s peers, even 
to the extent that it can override an agent’s own inclinations. Note the multiplicative form of λFi. 
A large influence by a small number of peers (“my best friend is doing it”) or a small influence 
by many peers (“everyone is doing it”) both affect an individual’s decisionmaking. Thus, 
seemingly inexplicable behavior such as participation by individuals inherently opposed to mass 
atrocities may be due to situational dynamics in spite of participating individuals’ own 
preferences: Despite misgivings, one goes along with the group. In network economics, the 
“puzzle” of mass participation can disappear. Indeed, the “mass” in mass atrocity—perhaps even 
the majority—may be inherently unwilling to participate and yet goes along owing to peer 
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influences within the network. Importantly, peer influence can be manipulated by atrocity 
architects, for example, through hate messaging and propaganda.  
Another network model with immediate applicability is Jackson and Zenou (2015). It has the 
added benefit of modeling conditions under uncertainty. Specifically, agents have incomplete 
information about the network structure. When choosing action 0 or 1 (do not or do participate in 
mass atrocity) each player in the network knows her own degree of network connectedness but is 
uncertain about neighbors’ degrees. Likewise, each player knows her cost of choosing action 1 
but not the neighbors’ costs. What emerges is a distribution of player types based on degree and 
cost. Assuming player neighbors are randomly chosen, and also payoff interdependence 
(strategic complements or substitutes) between pairs of linked players, behavior in the dynamic 
version of the model can lead to participation contagion. Jackson and Zenou (2015) derive the 
expected probability that a player’s neighbor will choose action 1 as a function of the expected 
probability that a player’s neighbor chose action 1 in the previous period. For strategic 
complements, the function monotonically increases and is generally nonlinear as shown in 
Figure 2.  
[Figure 2 here] 
The figure shows that multiple equilibria can exist (a, b, and c), two of which are stable (a 
and c). Applied to mass atrocity participation, equilibrium a implies zero probability of 
participation, while equilibrium c implies a high probability of participation. The figure also 
implies that initial conditions are critical, a routine finding in network research. If the initial 
population participation ratio, r0, lies to the left of p1, contagion will die out and equilibrium 
converges to p=0 at point a. If the initial ratio lies to the right of p1, however, a contagion of 
growing participation will play out on the network until equilibrium c is reached. Comparative 
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statics show that an upward shift in the Φ function will push the high participation equilibrium 
(c) up and to the right and point b down and to the left (not shown) (Galeotti, et al., 2010; 
Jackson and Zenou, 2015). This increases the degree of participation in the network associated 
with the high equilibrium (c) but also implies that an initial condition not too far to the left of p1 
might now be to the right of the (new) point b, thus kicking off a participation contagion toward 
the higher equilibrium, c. Such outcomes due to the upward shift in the Φ function will also 
occur if participation costs decrease or if the expected number of degrees of each neighbor rises 
(Jackson and Zenou, 2015, pp. 137–8).  
Models of the Schelling-Granovetter-Jackson-Zenou type have been applied to socially-
condoned mass coercion against females including polygyny, footbinding, female genital cutting, 
and sex-selective abortions.
30
 Anderton and Brauer (2018) do the same with a focus on mass 
atrocity. In their work, an S-shaped diffusion curve of a norm of atrocity acceptance emerges 
from an adapted Easley-Kleinberg (2010, ch. 17) model, with the added benefit that the micro 
foundations of the diffusion curve are explicit in the form of agents’ reservation (demand) 
functions, a peer effect function, the (derived) aggregate benefits function, and the per person 
cost of atrocity perpetration. By manipulating the elements of the model, atrocity architects can 
attempt to achieve the high participation they seek. As in Jackson and Zenou (2015), when 
lowering the cost of atrocity participation, the equilibrium threshold (the tipping point) to be 
crossed will be lowered. Mathematically, this implies that the high participation equilibrium 
level will increase which, in turn, leads to a greater rate of participation once the (lowered) 
threshold is gotten over. Alternatively, atrocity architects can attempt to shift the diffusion curve 
upward by increasing actors’ intrinsic valuations for atrocity (e.g., by propaganda) and/or by 
promoting greater network benefits from atrocity. Of course, atrocity preventers want to do the 
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opposite to create an alternative diffusion. For example, Staub (1989, pp. 165-6) documents that 
in the French village of Le Chambon during the Holocaust, “caring was infectious” as key 
leaders helped “convert” police and inhabitants to helping and resisting Nazi orders to turn over 
Jews. 
As a final example, we turn to the linear quadratic model (LQM) which despite loss of 
generality allows one to derive explicit solutions and incorporate agent heterogeneities with 
relative ease.
31
 One application, again, is in Anderton and Brauer (2018). Figure 3 is a stylized 
depiction of a social network designed to bring out-group destruction to three villages, A, B, and 
C. At the network’s center is player 1, the atrocity architect. Players 2, 3, and 4 are regional 
managers or bureau heads associated with each village. Players 5 to 10 are commanders of troops 
in their assigned locales. Each player i chooses an action’s intensity, xi≥0, assumed to be harm 





2 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗 ,𝑗≠𝑖  where ai≥0 and bi>0 are benefit and cost scalars, respectively, and 
wij≥0, the peer effect, is the weight or importance that player i places on player j’s action (as in 
Jackson, 2008, p. 290). Each unit of action xi brings player i marginal benefits of 𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑗≠𝑖  
at marginal costs of bixi. The wij parameter captures strategic complementarities (when wij>0) 
among linked agents and thus the increase in i’s wellbeing when j’s positive action interacts with 
i’s positive action (xixj). Multiple reasons for strategic complementarities exist, including 
comradery among in-group players or information flows among networked agents that enhance 
the “ideological necessity” of destroying an out-group (Kühne, 2010). Player i maximizes Ui by 
choosing xi, with all other elements in the equation treated parametrically. From this, a system of 
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reaction functions can be derived and an aggregate amount of actions (harm), X*, can be 
computed. 
[Figure 3 here] 
Numerous comparative static and other analyses are possible in the LQM. In addition to 
policies (for example, sanctions, threats of litigation, forceful interventions) that might affect the 
benefits, costs, and network synergies of perpetrating agents in the network, one can identify and 
remove the network’s key player (Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou, 2006). In considering 
more complex networks, one could incorporate the infiltration of atrocity resisters into the 
network (that is, negative w terms when interacting with atrocity perpetrators) or a prevention 
network in contestation with a perpetration network in which outcomes are determined by 
strategic positioning and Tullock-like contest success functions. Note, especially, that this and 
other network models are formulated in terms of agents’ utility functions which implies that 
behavioral and identity economics can be added to the network specifications. 
3.3.2 The nonstandard self: The complex self 
We discussed work focused on standard payoff functions (Section 3.1) enriched by concepts 
from behavioral and identity economics (3.2) and also work focused on behavior aggregation in 
social networks (3.3.1), whether built up from enriched utility functions or not. We now add 
another rubric: complex adaptive systems (CAS). First we discuss atrocity-relevant examples 
from evolutionary game theory (EGT) and then from agent-based models (ABM).  
The dynamics of social interactions can determine group-level outcomes that become self-
reinforcing: “Everyone conforms, everyone is expected to conform, and everyone wants to 
conform when they expect everyone else to conform” (Young, 2015, p. 359). Modeling social 
dynamics turns out to be more complex than modeling social equilibrium (Durlauf and Young, 
45 
 
2001). This is because complex systems “resist analytical derivation from the behavior of the 
individual parts” and because collective outcomes can be “emergent properties” of the system 
itself (Gintis, 2016, p. 110). Evolutionary models are defined by individuals interacting in a 
semi-autonomous and structured manner in a complex system characterized by recursive and 
nonlinear dynamics. In contrast to models with strategically interacting, payoff maximizing 
individuals under more or less strong rationality assumptions, complex adaptive models feature 
autonomous, heterogeneous agents following relatively simple and limited numbers of rules 
(heuristics) with resulting path dependency, complex unexpected behaviors, and emergent 
system properties. The central theme is not equilibrium but (constant) adjustment, either of 
agents in given systems and/or of systems with given agents (Wilson, 2016).  
To illustrate models of this type, we start with evolutionary game theory (EGT).
32
 For 
example, Arce and Sandler (2003) apply EGT to study pairwise interactions between individuals 
of fundamentalist (more intolerant) and nonfundamentalist (more tolerant) subpopulations. For 
fundamentalists to prevail, they either must display greater initial cohesion (less variance) within 
their subpopulation in making demands against nonfundamentalists or else face a relatively 
acquiescent nonfundamentalist subpopulation. To induce nonfundamentalists to behave 
fundamentalistically (for example, in outward appearance or religious observance), 
fundamentalist demands in pairwise interactions with nonfundamentalists must also appear 
reasonable, not strident. If successful, this can induce among nonfundamentalists what Kuran 
(1989, 1995) calls “preference falsification,” the public display of behavior privately opposed 
(akin to Michaeli and Spiro, 2017). This “chameleon” or “counterfeit” behavior by 
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 For a comparative review of EGT with ABM, see Adami, Schossau, and Hintze (2016). We do not address 
complex networks, a confluence of network analysis and complex systems. Some scholars may view machine-
learning and data-mining models (for instance, Douglass, 2016, on mass killing during the Vietnam War) as 
“complex” also, but here we regard them as pattern extraction and, possibly, forecasting and prediction tools 
(covered in Section 4) more than as explanatory tools. 
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nonfundamentalists adapting to fundamentalist demands in order to “fit in” can lead to seemingly 
tolerable coexistence between subpopulations even as society as a whole drifts into harmful 
behaviors such as the committing of mass atrocities under a fundamentalist ethos. Once the game 
has evolved, a shock sufficiently sharp to change the relevant proportion of preference falsifiers 
among the interacting subpopulations can reset the social dynamics to evolve toward more 
tolerant societies (for instance, in Germany and Japan following their defeats in World War II). 
Peaceful contravention of fundamentalism is studied in Arce and Sandler (2009), with the key 
result revolving around the degree to which policy can help discourage counterfeit behavior and 
encourage the public display of one’s private beliefs without falsification. 
Ille and Mansour (2015) present an EGT model to study the mass atrocities-rich attempt by 
‘Islamic State’ (IS) to capture territories and establish itself as a recognized sovereign state in 
international relations. It is modeled with two payoff functions, one when an atrocity strategy is 
played, the other when a nonatrocity strategy is played. The atrocity function states that payoffs 
are positive for IS when the number of atrocities committed rises and/or when the direct return 
per atrocity committed rises. But the payoff also depends on the opponent’s (potential 
intervener’s) behavior. This constitutes the cost part of the atrocity payoff function. If the 
opponent’s actual level of intervention is viewed by IS as half-hearted (below a threshold), then 
its atrocities are in essence vindicated and thus increase the overall payoff value, and vice versa. 
The nonatrocity payoff function states that if IS does not commit atrocities, it bears a reputation 
cost from not pursuing its universal entitlement claim. For the intervener, two corresponding 
payoff functions are modeled. In terms of results, an interior solution is driven by the initial 
levels of atrocities committed and interventions done, respectively. For example, high public 
support for intervention on account of a low level of atrocity “acceptance” (the intervener 
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“tolerates” some atrocities up to an acceptance level) serves as a credible threat of intervention. 
This level of support keeps atrocities relatively low and, therefore, requires few interventions. 
Conversely, seeming apathy toward atrocities goads IS to commit more of them. But the model’s 
comparative statics reveal that public support can go awry. Keeping all parameters constant 
except for the “return to intervention” parameter, which reflects the strength of public support for 
intervention, can lead either to evolutionarily stable mixed strategies (ESS) or to a mutual corner 
ESS in which pure strategies of atrocities and interventions prevail. This outcome depends only 
on the initial levels of atrocities and intervention. Even with high public support, if 
interventionists underreact to initial atrocities, the resulting escalation equilibrium is stable. The 
reason is that even when IS loses from any given intervention, committing atrocities can carry 
net benefits inasmuch as they provoke attention to its cause. Reducing IS’ benefits from 
committing atrocities requires, the comparative statics reveal, not merely public support for 
intervention per se but also that they be effective and enduring (preventing IS from capitalizing 
on atrocities) and that they start off with low atrocity acceptance levels to begin with. Inadequate 
disgust can lead to (stable) escalation. Findings like this should give genocide scholars and 
intervention policymakers pause to consider more fully the requisites for and dynamics of 
intervention. 
Other EGT applications related to mass atrocities include Anderton (2015), Gangopadhyay 
(2016), and Young (2015). Anderton (2015), for example, finds that policy “dithering” 
(intervention delay) is harmful inasmuch as it permits the gradual accumulation of more 
“aggressive” types until a threshold is reached beyond which the social system as a whole 
switches from peaceful to aggressive and future intervention may no longer be effective in 
preventing genocide. Gangopadhyay (2016) presents a complex group identity-based, 
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evolutionary threshold model with endogenous equilibria selection for heterogeneous societies in 
which individual in-group agents incorporate reference group considerations and may engage in 
killings of members of an out-group even if their own reference group opposes such action. The 
model captures (1) the underlying game of interactions among society’s agents, (2) the economic 
structure that affects payoffs from mass killings, and (3) how killing or nonkilling strategies 
diffuse through a population. A key result is that a population’s average propensity to carry out 
mass killing, or the proportion of the population “programmed” to choose a level of mass killing 
greater than a certain threshold, determine whether the equilibrium is a mass killing society or 
not. Finally, we note that Young (2015) analyzes the evolution of social norms using stochastic 
evolutionary game theory. Among his many applications, Young offers a brief analysis of 
footbinding, arguably a mass atrocity perpetrated upon females. 
Like EGT, agent-based models (ABM) have been applied to numerous forms of human 
interactions such as peaceful mass migration, evacuation management, general crime, organized 
crime, terror, cyber violence, and war.
33
 Direct applications to mass atrocities have also emerged. 
For example, von Briesen, Bacaksizlar, and Hadzikadic (2017) built an ABM model with six 
agent attributes: identity, ideology, exertion of influence, susceptibility to influence, threshold to 
act, and radius of sight (distance to neighbors). Attributes are combined with rules regarding 
agent interaction, information updating, action-taking, and the passing on of parent traits to 
offspring. Starting from a population split equally by an identity attribute but otherwise facing 
the same conditions (save for random initialization) leads, in all model runs, to the stark result 
that genocide always is the emergent outcome! In the model, the mere concept of ‘the other’ 
suffices to produce this result. However, due to random initialization, the number of generations 
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al. (2016), Choi and Bowles (2007). 
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it takes to arrive at the genocide outcome varies considerably across model runs. The authors 
observe that stable boundary regions between identity groups can persist for lengthy periods of 
time. Further research will need to explore extensions, for example, the introduction of a third 
identity group or nonrandom initial distributions, but even the base result raises important policy 
questions such as whether characteristics of boundary agents differ appreciably from those of 
nonboundary agents located elsewhere in the model space. How do the characteristics of 
boundary agents change over model generations? Are there characteristic system-level changes 
just prior to the successful breakdown of a boundary that then lead to the elimination of one 
group? Boundary protection or group containment control is also the subject of related research 
in social network models (Kan, et al., 2014) wherein groups, or leaders of groups, seek to 
penetrate ideological or other boundaries of another group and, simultaneously, seek to inoculate 
their own borders from susceptibility to invasion.  
In another example, Ille (2017b) uses EGT and ABM to study competing sectarian identities. 
Ethnic factionalism—one way in which sectarianism can be expressed—has been taken into 
account by scholars but usually on an a priori basis. It is studied by assumption rather than in a 
co-evolutionary context. For Ille, in contrast, conflict between identity groups must evolve out of 
the model. The coercive nature of sects, free-riding within sects, and social inefficiency (due to 
sectarian conflict) can, but need not, arise from within the model. Run with various initializations 
and parameter combinations, the results show that “sectarian identities are not perpetual, but 
constructed by a process of past interactions” (p. 15). While sectarian social contracts are likely 
to evolve under certain conditions, sectarian affiliation per se does not cause sectarian conflict; 
affiliation just assigns a role within a situation. In contrast, “externally reinforced differences 
along sectarian fault-lines obviate the emergence of egalitarian social contracts and can lead to 
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sectarian conflict” (p. 16). The reason is that, in the model, external mobilization can lead to 
coordination failures and contests over a sect’s position within a social contract, or else that 
within-sect imbalances can generate cross-sectarian conflict and further imbalances within other 
sects. Unlike Golman, et al.’s (2016) discussion of agents’ preference for belief consonance 
(Section 3.2), for Ille (2017b) the apparent “narcissism of small differences” is not due to “minor 
ideological disparities but [to] a divergent perception of the role assigned to the sectarian 
marker” (p. 16). This type of modeling is important as it picks up on why some societies with 
diverse ethnic compositions may collapse into mass atrocities while others do not. 
3.4 Tributary 4: Political economy 
Political science emphasizes the study of political institutions (principles, organization, and 
methods of legitimate authority). Behind institutions lie the acquisition, allocation, use of, and 
change in power, including the use of threat and coercion. Invariably, cost-benefit considerations 
enter. We illustrate aspects of political economy and mass atrocity by selectively discussing 
types of dictatorship (Section 3.4.1), ideology and the use of hatred (3.4.2), and the struggle for 
societies in transition from dictatorship to democracy (3.4.3). 
 In models of dictatorship, the desire for power enters the utility function as an objective to be 
achieved; mass atrocity may be a means of achieving power. However, the objective may instead 
be to advance a particular ideology (or otherwise achieve infamy); power, including the possible 
use of mass atrocity, then is among the possible means of realizing the goal. The study of 
transition to democracy is important for at least two reasons. First, it may help identify necessary 
conditions to make the transition smooth and bloodless, more so since periods of transition are 
widely recognized as fraught with danger (Fein, 1995; Mann, 2005; Esteban, Morelli, and 
Rohner, 2015). Second, however, while desirable in many respects, it turns out that democracy is 
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neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent mass atrocity. Nondemocracies need not spiral into 
episodes of mass atrocities, whereas democracies can descend into mass slaughter (Mann, 2005; 
Madley, 2016). 
3.4.1 The nonstandard self: The dictatorial self 
Absent political competition, societies can descend into dynastic dictatorships (Olson, 1993), 
often characterized by unbridled rent-seeking and kleptocracy.
34
 To kleptocratic consumption, 
Wintrobe (1998) adds the desire for power itself to a dictator’s utility function, and power 
requires expenditure on repression and/or on purchasing the loyalty of subject populations. 
Relying wholly on standard theory extended to the political realm, Wintrobe generates a two-by-
two schema reflecting four ideal-type dictatorship equilibria under high or low levels of 
repression and loyalty, respectively (Figure 4). 
[Figure 4 here] 
Different constellations of circumstances result in different equilibrium combinations of 
repression and loyalty. To deal with what Wintrobe characterizes as the Dictator’s Dilemma—
“the greater the dictator’s power, the more reason he or she has to be afraid” (1998, p. 22)—both, 
tyrant and totalitarian seek recourse to high levels of repression.
35
 But a tyrant sees less reason to 
purchase the loyalty of needed retainers, or any portion of the population at large, than does the 
totalitarian who, for example, may need to placate members of a totalitarian party. In contrast, 
“tinpot” dictators and “timocrats” (from the Greek thymos, to love or respect) both seek low 
levels of repression. The timocrat does so because he believes that his “love for the people is 
reciprocated by them” (p. 14). In contrast, the tinpot dictator’s interest lies in resource 
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 The dilemma, Wintrobe points out, is two-sided: “As much as dictators want to be loved, the subjects want them 
to believe that they are loved, for only then are the people safe from them” (1998, p. 22). 
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exploitation for his own kleptocratic enrichment, for which purpose little more than a palace 
guard will do, but not otherwise to “disturb the traditional way of life of the people” (p. 11). 
Wintrobe (1998) rarely addresses issues of mass atrocity directly but his examples, especially 
those regarding totalitarian regimes (Hitler, Stalin), point to conditions under which mass 
atrocity can flourish. Verwimp (2003a), however, constructs a direct application of Wintrobe’s 
totalitarian dictator model to Rwanda in the 1980s and 1990s. The paper is relevant in several 
respects: First, it is both theoretical and empirical; second, it integrates fluctuations in 
international commodity markets into the analysis (in this case, the world price of coffee); and 
third, it shows that adverse external shocks affecting the coffee market contributed directly to 
then-President Habyarimana’s difficulty to continue to buy the Wintrobian loyalty of the affected 
population which, for Habyarimana to stay in power, then necessitated an increasingly repressive 
dictatorship. For a time, however, reliance on repression was mitigated by compensatory foreign 
aid inflows that helped stabilize Habyarimana’s regime until the genocide erupted so explosively 
in 1994. 
Somewhat neglected in the analytical literature, the international political economy links are 
interesting as even a cursory reading of case studies reveals many instances of mass atrocities 
tied to external events. Indeed, in her review of the Rwandan genocide, Friedman (2016) goes 
beyond the world coffee market in adding the world tin market whose price also collapsed. As 
tin is mined rather than cropped, it affected different population segments. Since coffee and tin 
had been Rwanda’s number one and two export earners, the opportunity cost of rebellion fell, a 
theme also modeled and estimated in Gangopadhyay’s (2016) study of Sunni-on-Shiite mass 
killings in Pakistan, 1978–2012, in which declining world sugar prices play a significant role in 
increasing the killings. Regarding the role of foreign aid, Marriage (2016) discusses the 
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“compatible logics” of peace and mass killing in the nominally postconflict Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC) in the wake of the Second Congo War (1998–2003). Whereas much of the 
economics-oriented literature believes that “addressing the economic functions of violence could 
throw its mechanism into reverse and lead to peace,” for instance by applying global economic 
levers to compel misbehaving dictators to change course, Marriage argues that the very opposite 
applies to the DRC: “… mass atrocities persisted and profits continued to accrue to political 
elites, those of neighboring countries, their armies and allied militias, and foreign companies 
[and that] a bargain was struck between northern donors and elite Congolese politicians in the 
peace agreement that provided unmonitored aid and facilitated the rapid, unregulated 
liberalization of assets”—that is, the exploitation of the country’s natural-resource wealth (pp. 
356–7). The intent to reverse Marriage’s “economic function of violence” with counter-violence 
economics perhaps may be read as a form of “motivated belief” among the elite of global 
political and economic decisionmakers. If so, this may carry dire implications for postwar peace 
and reconstruction efforts, which frequently fail and lead to the resumption of violent conflict 
(Hartzell, 2017). 
3.4.2 The nonstandard self: The ideological self 
In the foregoing, power is the objective and ideologically-driven hatred can be among the means 
to rile up an in-group. But what if ideology itself is the objective and power is part of the set of 
constraints (Bernholz, 2001)? Informal power is a means to foster the spread of the ideology 
until formal power is gained. Once gained, formal power can then be “used to tax and to use 
government revenues to finance the conversion of believers, the removal of inconvertibles and 
the effort to increase the probability of spreading the totalitarian regime internationally, which 
both may imply the use of force” (p. 36). Pushed by their beliefs, adherents are willing to expend 
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limited resources, and consequently sacrifice a measure of consumption, in order to gain 
converts and to punish inconvertibles who are viewed as enemies. This captures the possibility of 
utopian atrocity architects (Valentino, 2004).
36
 
Like Wintrobe (1998), Bernholz’s (2001) technical work relies on standard tools. Unlike 
Wintrobe, he directly raises the issue of mass atrocities that may be “needed” to cow or convert 
unbelievers into submission to the one true faith, or else to eliminate them. Bernholz further 
argues that the nature of ideology, with its claim of universal reach, is all-embracing in outlook 
and imperialistic in action. A recent example would be that of ‘Islamic State’. It follows that an 
ideology either does become universal, or else must peter out geographically, its domestic aims 
having been reached. In the latter case, the ideology “matures” and may become an territorially 
confined ideocracy more than it becomes a totalitarian regime, hence perhaps less reliant on 
terror and repression—another distinction between Bernholz and Wintrobe.  
 Regardless of whether power or ideology is the objective, atrocities require on-the-ground 
perpetrators, and instilling envy, spite, malice, or hate are among the tools that can be employed 
to motivate them (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Hillman, 2010; Gershman, 
2013; Levin, 2014). In a foundational model, Glaeser (2005) examines the instrumental creation 
and use of ideologized hate for political ends. He posits that when audiences are willing to listen 
to hate (demand), then political leaders can create hate (supply). For politicians, the relevant 
calculus revolves around whether any designated out-group is important to the political issue at 
stake and whether the group is sufficiently isolated for it to serve as an effective casus belli 
against which to rally one’s own adherents. For listeners, the relevant calculus revolves around 
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the cost of investigating the veracity of politicians’ hate stories set against any private benefit 
derived from learning the truth about such stories. Hate will not spread when listeners have 
sufficient private incentive to seek out the truth. This incentive is subject to manipulation by 
politicians. If a listener’s private benefit can be lowered, or if the cost of learning the truth can be 
increased, hate may spread. Incessant repetition and unending variation in hate stories, for 
example, increase the cost of verification. Glaeser applies the model to three cases, all of which 
relate to mass atrocities: (1) anti-Black hatred in the American South; (2) political anti-Semitism 
in nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe; and (3) modern anti-Americanism in the Middle 
East. For instance, in a counter-example to help make his point, Glaeser writes that in contrast to 
much of Europe “political anti-Semitism was generally absent from Italy from 1860 to 1935 … 
Like Germany, Italy was unified by a king whose supporters were the postunification right, but 
Italy’s right wing was implacably opposed by the Church because the unification of Italy in 1871 
had involved the expropriation of Papal property. Pius IX excommunicated the King and pretty 
much anyone else involved in Italian politics. Since both the right and left were anticlerical, Jews 
were spread across the aisle and were politically irrelevant. As the model suggests, when the 
outgroup does not differ in a policy-relevant way, hatred serves no purpose” (p. 75). In Germany, 
of course, things were different. Whereas Glaeser (2005) eschews adopting any notion of identity 
for his model, Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2016) meld Glaeser’s economics of hate model with 
Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) and Sen’s (2006) ideas concerning (multiple) identities to 
formulate an extended model then applied to mass atrocity in Indonesia in the mid-1960s.  
3.4.3 The nonstandard self: Democracy and the institutional self 
Unlike Wintrobe (1998) or Bernholz (2001), for Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) the concern lies 
less with varieties of ideologies and dictatorships than with how democracies may arise (or fail 
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to arise) out of forms of dictatorship. In this they resemble Olson (1993). Their tools, however, 
are game-theoretic, aimed at elucidating the strategic nature of the interaction between rulers and 
ruled and anchored around the question of whether and how rulers can credibly commit not to 
abuse whatever political privilege the ruled may grant. Their work helps to illuminate the 
conditions under which mass atrocity can arise, operate, and dissipate. At issue are distributional 
conflicts, over power as well as over income, between two idealized groups. Enriched by 
assumptions on the relative size of the populations and the nature of the political power one or 
the other (sub)group may possess, numerous model permutations and associated findings 
emerge. For example, if despite a numerical disadvantage, the “rich” wield political power 
sufficient to sway even an otherwise democratic-looking, median-voter setup, then, in the 
extreme, the (re)distributional outcome may not differ at all between democracies and 
nondemocracies (p. 116). Democracy alone does not guarantee the absence of mass violence (see 
also Mann (2005) who, in the words of Bloxham and Moses (2010, p. 9) “debunks the spurious 
notion that democracies do not engage in genocide, and thus the idea that the spread of 
(capitalistic) democracy is the antidote to genocide as well as war.”). Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006) stay within the territorial boundaries of a political entity, usually conceptualized as a 
nation-state. Mass atrocities, however, can be carried out across such boundaries, for example, 
imperial Japanese atrocities committed in Nanjing, China. 
Verwimp (2004a) may be read as an applied example of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). 
Discussing Rwanda’s polity prior to the 1994 genocide, he sets up a model of nested games 
where each game’s payoff depends on the other games’ payoffs. From 1990–3, Rwanda’s 
autocratic regime (the “dictator” player) faced domestic opposition in a transition game over 
democratization and, simultaneously, faced a rebel group in a civil war game. Payoffs in each are 
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affected by a fourth player, the “international community.” In the transition game, the dictator’s 
preference ordering is B > B–CT > B/2 > 0, where B is benefits (control over the national budget) 
and CT is the cost of buying the loyalty of, or else repressing, the opposition. So long as CT < 
B/2, this is better than sharing budget resources (B/2) with the opposition. For the opposition, the 
preference ordering is B > B/2 > R > 0, where R is the cost of resisting the dictator (with R < 
B/2). As it turns out, the Nash equilibrium is an unsatisfactory outcome for both players and not 
Pareto-efficient. To permit any other outcome, either the preference orderings or the game 
structure has to change, a point to which we return momentarily. Meanwhile, in the civil war 
game, the dictator’s initial preference ordering is B > B/2 > B–CW > 0, where CW reflects the war 
costs. For the rebels (the Rwandan Patriotic Front, RPF), B > B/2 > M > 0, where M reflects 
RPF’s gain under mutual warfare. Here, a prisoners’ dilemma results with war as the outcome. 
As the dictator plays two separate, nonnested games, he examines the combined payoff function 
(which can include a term to weigh the relative importance to the dictator of the transition and 
war games).  
However, the games can interact in that the rebel group’s actions (the RPF gained ground 
from 1990–3), and even its very presence, can spur the opposition to increase its resistance to the 
dictator which, in turn, can increase the dictator’s cost of buying off the opposition or else spend 
more to repress it.
37
 Still looking to maximize the payoff from the combined payoff function, this 
can lead the dictator’s preference ordering in the transition game to switch such that the dictator 
faces prisoners’ dilemma equilibria in both of the nested games. Nesting, or linkage, changes the 
games. An otherwise noncooperative dictator in nonnested games may feel compelled to 
cooperate in one or more games when they are nested, presumably an outcome the dictator 
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dislikes. The dictator therefore possesses an incentive to change the game’s very structure, which 
might involve the removal of a player in one game thus collapsing two games into one remaining 
(institutional) game. Since rebels are war-like, it is natural to focus on eliminating the nonwar-
like opposition player in the transition game. This, Verwimp states, is what happened in Rwanda, 
where “elimination” meant splitting the opposition into two camps, one aligned with the dictator 
(Habyarimana) and one that joined the rebels (p. 19). This involved killing “moderate Hutu,” 
demonizing all Tutsi as “rebels,” and creating the impression of an “ethnicity”-based conflict. By 
1994, this also meant killing Tutsi altogether, so that “the genocide of the Tutsi minority can be 
understood to deal with another institution or rule of the game, namely its infinity” (Verwimp, 
2004a, p. 37). If one kills moderate Hutu, one collapses two games into one; if one kills all Tutsi, 
one no longer has to worry about playing any game at all (p. 37).
38
 The threat of a transition to 
democracy (sharing B with the opposition) can hasten mass atrocity. 
3.5 A summative statement 
Standard theory contains rich concepts and tools with which to (re)interpret instances of mass 
atrocities across a wide range of cases and, as such, can be helpful in comparative studies. 
Within well-established theoretical frameworks, it facilitates reflection upon perpetrators’ and 
victims’ constraints, substitution possibilities, strategic behavior, the potential to incentivize 
(mis)behavior, and the potential for and limits to effective intervention. Behavioral and identity 
economics add to the standard toolkit, for example, by exploring the nature and role of personal 
and group identities in preference (re)formation and how they may open up, or constrain, an 
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actor’s conception of what beliefs and decision choices are possible. Knowledge about 
psychosocial biases, motivated reasoning, and bounds to rationality all can help to explore case 
studies of mass atrocity with theoretically grounded tools. As these advances still seek recourse 
to standard theory’s core of utility and production functions, the issue is not “rational” versus 
“nonrational” actors, but to incorporate both possibilities within a net payoff-maximization 
framework. While it surprises how few applications one finds of behavioral economics to mass 
atrocities (Anderton, 2014b), perhaps the greater promise lies with the line of inquiry begun by 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) which carries numerous implications, for instance in regard to the 
nature, role, and power of intermediaries in groups and the manipulation and management of 
identity. 
This leads to the modeling of social networks and complex systems. Inherent and 
manufactured identities, motivated beliefs, and cost-benefit-driven individual adoption of roles in 
social situations can aggregate in networks which, in turn, can lead to unpredictable feedback 
effects on sets of peers in local neighborhoods and the individuals therein. Virtually any 
observed mass atrocity outcome is, in principle, amenable to modeling founded on network 
analysis and can help explain a large number of puzzles scholars of mass atrocities have 
struggled with. We highlight three of them.
39
 First, while social psychologists long have known 
that it can be frightfully easy to recruit relatively small numbers of ordinary people into 
“becoming evil” (Waller, 2007; Roth, 2010), network models additionally explain mass 
participation in mass atrocity. Second, these models can explain why mass atrocity spreads in 
location (or society) A yet stays contained in location B even if individuals in both locations 
share identical characteristics. Third, the models can explain why people who are strongly 
opposed to acts of mass atrocity nonetheless help commit them. Network theory can provide 
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 See Anderton and Brauer (2018) for more. 
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compelling insights into these behaviors without appealing to wildly changing or bizarre 
preferences or circumstances (Gintis, 2009). The puzzle no longer is why mass atrocities can 
arise; instead, valid questions remain regarding how they arise and play out in specific cases. 
This is a considerable advance in scholarship and begins to make thoughts regarding timely and 
effective intervention, or even prevention, potentially tractable. Finally, perspectives of political 
economy, usually also built upon the core of standard theory, can help to investigate mass 
atrocities across the spectrum from dictatorship to democracy in theory-grounded, formal ways. 
Among other findings are the caution not to fetishize democracy for its own sake and to consider 
nested games played by the various vested interests involved. 
We conclude this section with five summary observations. First, despite their diversity, the 
surveyed approaches are unified in their focus on the cost-benefit (or net payoff or fitness) 
calculus implied by Robbins’ (1937) choice-theoretic view. Second, standard theory alone 
cannot adequately explain mass atrocities; broader, more comprehensive explanations require the 
whole gamut of approaches. Third, scholars’ predominant interest lies in the actions of 
perpetrators, certainly more so than in the (in)actions of bystanders (including potential mass 
atrocity interveners) and one finds an almost complete absence of studying the feasible choice set 
of (potential) victims and how their constraints may be lessened. Fourth, tightening constraints 
on perpetrators need not symmetrically loosen those of victims, and may worsen them 
(unintended “backfire” effects of intervention). Fifth, social networks and entire social systems 
can take on a life of their own and spiral out of control. Even when no one in particular intends 
any great harm to anyone else, system effects can take over and “direct” the future course of 
events. Thus, personalized theories that focus on individual culpability or victimhood in mass 
atrocity have to be complemented by theories of behavior in social contexts. 
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We now turn to a discussion of empirical evidence. 
 
4. Actors and Their Choices: Empirical Evidence 
This section surveys (Section 4.1) and summarizes (4.2) empirical evidence on risk factors and 
seriousness of mass atrocities. This work spans five tributaries: (1) large-n cross-country studies 
of the correlates of high-level mass atrocities (samples typically include cases with 1,000+ 
fatalities), (2) large-n cross-country studies of the correlates of “low-level” violence against 
civilians (VAC) (cases or events with <1,000 fatalities), (3) empirical determinants of atrocity 
seriousness (for example, number of fatalities or number of attacks), (4) forecasting, and (5) 
micro-level studies that emphasize individual participation in atrocities and/or the spread of VAC 
across locales for specific atrocity cases.
40
 
4.1 Survey of empirical evidence 
4.1.1 Large-n studies of cross-country evidence of high-level mass atrocity risks 
The first generation of cross-country empirical studies emerged in the work of Rummel (1995), 
Krain (1997), and Harff (2003) and focused on the risks of government perpetration of mass 
atrocities. Rummel (1995) used factor analysis to ascertain risk factors for democide, “the 
intentional killing of people by government” (p. 4), which includes genocide and politicide. 
Krain and Harff, however, used a logit specification to assess risk factors for genocide and 
politicide and their dependent variable is an indicator of the onset of either event in country i in 
year t. Each includes k lagged independent variables given by vector Xit−1 proxying political, 
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 A comprehensive survey of the rapidly growing empirical atrocity literature may require a book-length treatment, 
similar to Geller and Singer (1998) for the literature on interstate conflict and Collier and Sambanis (2005, vols. 1 
and 2) and Mason and Mitchell (2016) for the literature on civil war. In our limited survey here, we focus upon 
major risk factors for high- and low-level atrocities and atrocity seriousness across wide swathes of literatures 
without focusing heavily on how results vary across types of actors (for example, governments, rebels, militias) or 
atrocities (for example, genocides, politicides, mass killings, VAC). 
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social, and economic conditions that each anticipates will affect the onset probability, 
𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 = Λ(𝛽0 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏
′ 𝜷𝒌 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡). 
Based on her own dataset of genocides specifically (rather than mass atrocities broadly) that 
occurred since 1955, Harff notes that almost all occur contemporaneously with or shortly after a 
civil conflict or regime collapse.
41
 The inverse does not follow: Many civil conflicts and regime 
changes do not involve genocides. Given civil conflict or severe regime change, Harff finds six 
factors that significantly elevate genocide risk: (1) large political upheaval, (2) autocratic regime, 
(3) political elite holds an exclusionary ideology, (4) the ruling elite is from an ethnic minority, 
(5) history of prior genocide, and (6) a country is less open to economic trade. From a baseline 
probability of about three percent, Harff calculates that each of the six factors increases genocide 
risk between two and six percentage points. When all six factors occur together, genocide risk 
rises to 90 percent. Krain meanwhile finds that a particular form of political upheaval—civil 
war—is a significant predictor of genocide risk across all of his regressions, whereas other 
factors such as ethnic fractionalization, government concentration of power, and a country’s 
percentage of world trade are not. 
Many of the cross-country risk studies that followed Krain and Harff also employed a logit 
model (or probit or rare events logit), but with different samples of countries, time periods, and 
sets and/or measures of explanatory variables.
42
 In addition, some scholars employed alternative 
measures of the dependent variable including genocide occurrence as distinct from onset or mass 
atrocity onset or occurrence as distinct from genocide.
43
 Moreover, a few scholars employed 
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 To economize, we use “genocide” here to include politicides. This does not mean that we view genocides and 
politicides as conceptually the same. They are distinguished in the Political Instability Task Force Geno-politicide 
(or PITF-G) dataset and in some empirical studies (for example, Uzonyi, 2015, 2018).  
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 Colaresi and Carey (2008), Melander (2009), Hazlett (2011), Anderton and Carter (2015), Esteban, Morelli, 
Rohner (2015), Uzonyi (2015, 2018), Kim (2018), Nichols (2018). 
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 Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004), Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat (2006), Aydin and Gates (2008), 
Montalvo and Reynal-Queral (2008), Querido (2009), Kim (2010), Quinn (2015), Brehm (2017a), Krcmaric (2018). 
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hazard models rather than or in addition to logit (for instance, Wayman and Tago, 2010; 
Anderton and Carter, 2015). One study, importantly, assesses the risk factors for mass atrocities 
conducted by nonstate actors (rebel groups and pro-government militias) (Loyle, 2018). Such 
studies generally consider most or all of four intersecting classes of independent variables: (1) 
upheaval and threat such as threats to leaders’ political or territorial control or opportunities to 
eliminate rivals, (2) state political regime and institutions such as autocracy/democracy or 
constraints on executive leaders, (3) social fragmentation such as polarization/fractionalization or 
political and economic discrimination, and (4) economic conditions such as development, natural 
resources, and trade.
44
 We now summarize each of these. 
First, upheaval or threat. The most robust finding to date is that, all else equal, proxies for 
upheaval and threat are usually significantly associated with greater mass atrocity risk.
45
 This 
includes proxies for civil wars (or interstate wars or wars more generally),
46
 number of years of 
prior upheaval (Hazlett, 2011), types of leaders that come into power such as revolutionary 
leaders or irregular leadership changes including coups and assassinations (Brehm, 2017a; Kim, 
2018), degree of civilian support for rebels (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Kim, 
2010), new state status (Anderton and Carter, 2015), and interstate rivalry (Uzonyi, 2018). 
Second, almost all studies include a measure of countries’ political regime and/or 
institutional constraints on political leaders. Among the many that include political regime level, 
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 An additional class is conflict history (for example, past human rights violations, past mas atrocities) but results 
are quite mixed (Harff, 2003; Colaresi and Carey, 2008; Melander, 2009; Hazlett, 2011; Anderton and Carter, 2015; 
Uzonyi, 2015; Brehm, 2017a; Nichols, 2018). 
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 Many case studies highlight the role of a perceived emerging (or emerged) existential threat; for example, case 
studies or synopses of the destruction of the Yana Indians in Northern California in the 1860s and 1870s (Madley, 
2016), Armenia (Adalian, 2013), the Holocaust (Valentino, 2004), China during the Cultural Revolution (Cribb, 
2010), West Papua in the late 1960s (Robinson, 2010), Cambodia (Valentino, 2004), Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2009), 
and the Anfal operations in Iraqi Kurdistan (Leezenberg, 2013). 
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 Krain (1997), Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004), Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat (2006), Downes (2008), 
Downes and Cochran (2010), Melander (2009), Wayman and Tago (2010), Hazlett (2011), Esteban, Morelli, and 
Rohner (2015), Anderton and Carter (2015), Uzonyi (2015, 2018), Brehm (2017a), Kim (2018). 
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about half find that democracy correlates to low, and/or autocracy to high, mass atrocity risk 
while the other half find no significant effect. Four studies (Fein, 1995; Hazlett, 2011; Anderton 
and Carter, 2015; Kim, 2018) find that mixed political regimes (anocracies) are at greater risk 
than either autocracies or democracies. Importantly, Fein (1995) and Esteban, Morrelli, and 
Rohner (2015) find that transition from nondemocracy to democracy elevates risk even when 
controlling for political regime level. Meanwhile, Colaresi and Carey (2008) and Brehm (2017a) 
find that constraints on executive leaders reduce mass atrocity risk (see also Hazlett, 2011). 
Third, social fragmentation exists when groups within a society form parallel economic, 
political, and cultural structures with relatively little interaction between them and in which some 
groups are closed off to opportunities available to others (Waller, 2016, p. 181).
47
 Various 
theoretical rationales have led to numerous variable measures for social fragmentation in 
empirical studies including ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), ethnic polarization, ruling 
elite ethnicity and/or exclusionary ideology, political and/or economic marginalization or 
discrimination, and identity- (ethnic, religious) or ideology-based conflict. Among studies that 
include ELF (or close variants thereof), most find that the coefficient estimate is generally not 
significant, although there are exceptions.
48
 Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat (2006) is the only 
empirical study of which we are aware that considers a nonlinear effect of ELF on mass atrocity 
risk, finding that low ELF corresponds to high risk and vice versa, all else equal. Their result ties 
nicely to empirical tests of ethnic polarization because very low levels of ELF (that is, low 
diversity) correspond to high levels of ethnic polarization and growing values of ELF correspond 
to low indices of polarization in theoretical models (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2008, p. 
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 For the counter-example, social cohesion, and some conditions therein, see Jha (2007). 
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 Krain (1997), Colaresi and Carey (2008), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008), Anderton and Carter (2015), Kim 
(2010, 2018), Quinn (2015); exceptions include Aydin and Gates (2008), Querido (2009), Nichols (2018). 
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1841). Empirical results on the effects of ethnic polarization on mass atrocity risk are mixed.
49
 
Mixed results have also been reported in studies that include a proxy for exclusionary ideology 
and/or elite ethnicity
50
 or the presence of identity (ethnic or ideological) conflict.
51
 Of the few 
studies that include political and/or social marginalization, all find evidence of positive and 
significant effects on mass atrocity risk including for measures of political marginalization or 
discrimination (Kim, 2010; Brehm, 2017a), economic discrimination (Ulfelder and Valentino, 
2008; Anderton and Carter, 2015), general (political and economic) marginalization or 
discrimination (Anderton and Carter, 2015; Brehm, 2017a), and exclusionary ideology (Harff 
2003, Uzonyi 2018).  
Fourth, regarding economic conditions, most studies include a measure of real GDP per 
capita to proxy level of economic development, state strength, and/or the opportunity cost of 
participating in violent conflict.
52
 But only Scully (1997), Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat (2006), 
Anderton and Carter (2015), and Uzonyi (2018) report coefficient estimates that are generally 
negative and significant. Interestingly, Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat (2006) find that intermediate 
levels of GDP per capita are associated with greater mass atrocity risk. But when restricting their 
sample to twentieth century cases, they find a linear effect in which greater GDP per capita 
correlates to lower risk. They conclude that mass atrocities in the nineteenth century were more 
likely to occur in relatively rich countries; in the twentieth century the risk was greater in poorer 
countries. Scully (1997), meanwhile, interprets the significant negative relationship between real 
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 Positive, significant effects: Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008), Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner (2015); 
insignificant or negative effects: Colaresi and Carey (2008), Anderton and Carter (2015), Uzonyi (2015), Krcmaric 
(2018). 
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 Positive and significant: Hazlett (2011), Brehm (2017a); insignificant: Wayman and Tago (2010), Krcmaric 
(2018). 
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 Positive and significant: Quinn (2015); mixed: Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004). 
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 Scully (1997), Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat (2006), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008), Querido (2009), Kim 
(2010), Hazlett (2011), Anderton and Carter (2015), Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner (2015), Quinn (2015), Brehm 
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GDP per capita and democide as evidence that atrocity perpetrators obey the law of demand: The 
larger is real GDP per capita, the greater the opportunity cost or “price of the people being 
killed” (Scully, 1997, p. 81). 
Still regarding economic conditions, several studies consider the effect of natural resources 
on mass atrocity risk. Consistent with their theoretical model, Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner 
(2015) find that oil production as a fraction of GDP and resource rents from energy, minerals, 
and timber flows increase risk. Querido (2009) finds that some measures of natural resources 
(concentrations of diamonds, onshore oil production, and opium production) each increase risk, 
but Brehm (2017a) finds that the presence of diamond mines and oil production do not 
significantly affect such risk. Other resource measures used in risk studies do not find significant 
effects, including primary commodity exports as a share of GDP (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 
2008) and rebels’ access to natural resources (Kim, 2010).  
Other economic variables do not generally show significant effects, including economic 
crisis (Brehm, 2017a), income inequality (Kim, 2010), and economic growth or internet use per 
capita (Anderton and Carter, 2015). Effects of various trade measures (trade openness, trade as a 
percent of world trade, etc.) on mass atrocity risk are mixed. Some studies find trade correlates to 
significantly lower risk, but others find mixed or insignificant results.
53
  
In a word, of the four variable rubrics studies consider in large-n cross-country studies of 
mass atrocity (1,000+ fatalities) onset or occurrence, the only strongly consistent empirical result 
regards political upheaval and/or threat. 
4.1.2 Large-n studies of risks of “low-level” violence against civilians  
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 Lower: Hazlett (2011), Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner (2015); mixed or insignificant: Aydin and Gates (2008), 
Colaresi and Carey (2008), Anderton and Carter (2015), Brehm (2017a), Krcmaric (2018), Nichols (2018). 
67 
 
Mass atrocities rarely begin with killing 1,000 or more people; they usually begin with smaller-
scale violence against civilians (VAC) by which the literature means attacks in which estimated 
fatalities are below (and generally well below) the 1,000+ level of fatalities often associated with 
mass atrocities. As such, VAC risk studies may be helpful for empirical inquiry into how 
atrocities may scale up to cases that are “massive,” although to date such empirical inquiry is 
generally lacking (but see Anderton and Ryan, 2016; also see Section 3.3 for theoretical work 
that may bridge this span.) Another difference between large-n high-level and large-n “low-
level” atrocity risk studies concerns perpetrating actors. The high-level studies generally focus 
on governments as perpetrators. The VAC studies also consider governments (Tir and Jasinski, 
2008; DeMeritt, 2012; Machain and Rosenberg, 2018), but some study civilian attacks by rebel 
groups (Pospieszna and DeRouen, 2017), militias (Stanton, 2015), or combinations of state and 
nonstate actors (Eck and Hultman, 2007; Hicks, et al., 2011b; Anderton and Ryan, 2016). 
Despite a wide diversity in empirical materials such as dependent variable data sources, 
independent variables, perpetrating actors, and so on, most VAC empirical studies find that 
measures of threat or upheaval usually correlate to a significantly greater atrocity risk by state 
and/or nonstate actors.
54
 In contrast, empirical results for political regime are mixed.
55
 A few 
VAC risk studies include a measure for social fragmentation. For example, Tir and Jasinski 
(2008) find that minority groups that face political discrimination are more likely to be targeted 
by governments, all else equal. Machain and Rosenberg (2018) report mixed results on the 
effects of political discrimination on the risk of minority group rebellion and subsequent risk of 
VAC. Meanwhile, Anderton and Ryan (2016) report that their coefficient estimates for ELF are 
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 Eck and Hultman (2007), Tir and Jasinski (2008), Hicks, et al. (2011b), DeMeritt (2012), Stanton (2015), 
Anderton and Ryan (2016), Machain and Rosenberg (2018), Pospieszna and DeRouen (2017). 
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 Some find no significant effect for democracy (Eck and Hultman, 2007; Tir and Jasinski; 2008; Pospieszna and 
DeRouen, 2017); one reports a significant negative effect for democracy (Machain and Rosenberg, 2018); one finds 
that anocracies are at greater risk for VAC events than either democracies or autocracies (DeMeritt, 2012). 
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generally positive with about half being significant. Turning to economic variables, Tir and 
Jasinski (2008) find that greater economic growth and higher GDP per capita each significantly 
reduces VAC risk by governments. Machain and Rosenberg (2018), however, find that greater 
economic growth significantly increases the risk that minority groups will rebel against the state 
and that the state will violently repress groups. They interpret their results as consistent with a 
diversionary theory of attacks by states against internal (as distinct from external) enemies (see 
also Tir and Jasinski, 2008). Specifically, when economic conditions are poor (low economic 
growth), minority groups know that they are more likely to be targets of diversionary attacks by 
the government and so they are less likely to rebel and thus less likely to be violently attacked. 
Regarding natural resources, Pospieszna and DeRouen (2017) find that rebel access to 
contraband financing (illegal drug trafficking) and the presence of gemstones in the conflict zone 
significantly increase the risk of rebel-perpetrated atrocities. Finally, we note that foreign aid 
receipts (DeMeritt, 2012) and trade openness (Eck and Hultman, 2007; DeMeritt, 2015a) did not 
have significant impacts on VAC risk. 
An important additional aspect of the VAC literature is research that empirically assesses 
third-party efforts to stem atrocity. For example, Pospieszna and DeRouen (2017) hypothesize 
that third-party mediation during civil wars can be perceived as threatening to rebels, making 
rebels more likely to resort to VAC. After empirically modeling the likelihood that mediators 
will show up in civil wars, they find significant support for their hypothesis. DeMeritt (2012) 
considers “naming and shaming” actions of human rights organizations (HROs) and of the UN 
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and finds that for both naming and shaming significantly 
decreases the risk that governments will initiate violence. Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson (2018) 
focus on effects of UN peacekeeping troops on VAC risk in various locales in Africa. 
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Controlling for the likelihood of peacekeepers being deployed, they find that peacekeepers 
significantly reduce the risk of civilian targeting by rebels, but not by governments. The authors 
maintain that governments are better able than rebel groups to resist the aims of the peacekeepers 
in regard to civilian protection. 
In sum, as for the high-fatality (1,000+) studies, the atrocity-increasing risk effect of political 
upheaval and/or threat emerges as a consistent finding. Other results are mixed and/or too few in 
number to venture a statement. 
4.1.3 Atrocity seriousness 
Atrocity seriousness studies measure the dependent variable based on the magnitude of atrocity 
as distinct from onset or occurrence. As such, they employ count or categorical estimation 
methods such as negative binomial, Poisson, ordered logit or probit, or Tobit, although a few use 
OLS, GMM, or LSDV. 
Most of these studies find, again, that measures of threat or upheaval generally correlate to 
significantly greater civilian atrocities perpetrated by state and/or nonstate actors.
56
 Regarding 
political regimes, few general patterns emerge. Some find that democracy has a significant 
negative effect on atrocity seriousness of state and/or nonstate actors, but it is insignificant in 
others.
57
 Koren and Bagozzi (2017) find that anocracies are associated with the greatest 
seriousness by state and nonstate (rebels and militias) actors, but Eck and Hultman (2007) find 
the opposite. Relatedly, some find that the number of civilians killed by rebels is significantly 
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 Azam and Hoeffler (2002), Krain (2005), Hultman (2010, 2012), Wood (2010, 2014a, 2014b), Kathman and 
Wood (2011), Wood, Kathman, and Gent (2012), Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013), Fjelde and Hultman 
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(2016), Fisk (2018). 
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 Significant negative: Azam and Hoeffler (2002), Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat (2006), Wood, Kathman, and Gent 
(2012), Anderton and Ryan (2016), Kathman and Wood (2016), Koren and Bagozzi (2017); insignificant: Krain 
(2005, 2012, 2014, 2017), Kathman and Wood (2011), Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood (2014), Cohen and Nordås 
(2015), Jo and Simmons (2016, 2017). 
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greater under nonautocratic regimes (anocracies and/or democracies) relative to autocracies.
58
 
Interestingly, Jo and Simmons (2016, 2017) find that strength of a domestic statute dealing with 
international crimes and the strength of a country’s rule of law each exert a significant negative 
effect on the number of civilians killed by governments and rebels. 
Empirical results for social fragmentation measures also are disparate. For example, Wood 
(2014b) finds that ELF significantly increases the magnitude of rebel VAC, and Anderton and 
Ryan (2016) report similar results for governments, rebels, and militias. Others find that ELF is 
not significant or has a significant negative impact on atrocity seriousness.
59
 Fjelde and Hultman 
(2014) and Ottmann (2015), however, employ finer-grained measures of ethnicity. Fjelde and 
Hultman’s (2014) dependent variable is the number of civilians killed by governments or rebels 
in Africa per spatial/temporal grid, finding that governments kill significantly more civilians in 
grids in which civilians are ethnically aligned with rebel groups, and vice versa. Ottmann (2015) 
generally finds that greater ethnic fractionalization and greater ethnic polarization within rebel 
groups each significantly increases the magnitude of rebel VAC. 
Turning to economic variables, almost all of the studies that include real GDP per capita find 
that it usually has a significant negative effect on atrocity seriousness of governments and/or 
nonstate actors.
60
 Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat (2006) find that intermediate levels of income are 
associated with significantly greater magnitudes of civilian killing. Based on disaggregated data 
of geographic cells experiencing armed conflict in Africa, Fjelde and Hultman (2014) find that 
atrocity intensity is significantly lower in high income cells. Among studies that include a natural 
resource measure, a majority find that it exerts a positive and significant effect, although a few 
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 Azam and Hoeffler (2002), Krain (2005), Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat (2006), Querido (2009), Quinn (2015). 
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 Besançon (2005), Querido (2009), Wood (2010), Kathman and Wood (2011), Hultman (2012), Wood, Kathman, 
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report mixed results or no significant effect.
61
 Several studies find that greater external material 
support available to rebel groups usually significantly increases rebel killing of civilians.
62
 Most 
others find that foreign aid (as distinct from targeted material support for rebels) does not have a 
significant effect on the seriousness of government atrocities,
63
 but see Azam and Hoeffler 
(2002) for an exception. Among the few studies that include a trade measure, some find no 
significant effect on atrocity seriousness,
 
but others find that almost all of their coefficient 
estimates for the effects of trade are negative and some are significant.
64
  
Regarding third-party interventions into ongoing atrocities, several studies ask if intervention 
can reduce seriousness and, if so, what types of interventions work. First, Hultman (2010) 
considers the effect of UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) on the number civilians killed by 
governments, rebels, and in total in armed conflicts, 1989–2006, and finds that their mere 
presence does not reduce the magnitude of government atrocities. Disconcertingly, she finds that 
PKO presence significantly increases the seriousness of civilian killing by rebels. One moral-
hazard type of explanation for this result is that rebels use VAC to establish a stronger bargaining 
position vis-à-vis governments in the presence of PKOs. Another is that PKOs can spur factions 
to split off from the main rebel group which in turn leads to more VAC (Hultman, 2010, p. 39). 
Hultman does find, however, that when PKOs, in addition to presence, have a mandate to protect 
civilians, they exert a significant negative effect on atrocity seriousness. Hultman, Kathman, and 
Shannon (2013) and Kathman and Wood (2016) evaluate the effects of the composition of PKOs 
(the number of UN troops, police, and observers) on VAC, with the former focusing on periods 
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 Positive, significant: Hultman (2007), Querido (2009), Wood (2014a), Ottmann (2015), Wood and Kathman 
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 DeMeritt (2012), Krain (2014, 2017), Lee (2015), Anderton and Ryan (2016). 
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 No significant effect: Eck and Hultman (2007), Krain (2005, 2012, 2017). Often negative and sometimes 
significant: Krain (2014), DeMeritt (2015a), Anderton and Ryan (2016). See also Lee (2015). 
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of ongoing civil war and the latter on postconflict environments. Both studies account for 
endogeneity, that is, the propensity of the UN to select some mission areas over others, and both 
find that the number of UN troops is significantly correlated with fewer civilian killings in total, 
by governments, and by rebels (and also by militias in Kathman and Wood, 2016). Regarding the 
number of police, Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013) find a negative and significant effect, 
while Kathman and Wood’s (2016) results are mixed. Importantly, both studies find that the 
number of UN observers correlates to significantly more civilian killing, all else equal. The 
authors of both studies indicate that timid UN efforts are insufficient to deter civilian killing and 
may even signal actors that the UN is not (yet) serious about protecting civilians.  
Second, Kathman and Wood (2011), Krain (2005, 2014, 2017), and DeMeritt (2015a) 
consider the effects of third-party military interventions on the seriousness of civilian atrocities. 
The studies by Kathman and Wood and Krain use the same datasets to code genocide seriousness 
(Political Instability Task Force Geno-politicide dataset or PITF-G) and military interventions 
(International Military Interventions dataset), similar key intervention measures (pro-perpetrator, 
anti-target, anti-perpetrator, pro-target, and impartial interventions), and the same estimation 
method (ordered logit) but for different sample periods. One crucial difference is that Kathman 
and Wood (2011) record the number of years that interventions are in place as distinct from the 
number of interventions lagged one year. Distinguishing the intervention types in the short- and 
long term, they find that impartial and anti-perpetrator military interventions significantly worsen 
civilian killing in the short term. Longer term, enduring anti-perpetrator military interventions 
significantly worsen genocide seriousness; likewise, longer term impartial intervention has a 
significant negative effect. Results reported in Krain’s three studies are decidedly different, 
finding that only anti-perpetrator and pro-target interventions generally significantly reduce 
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genocide seriousness. Similarly, DeMeritt (2015a) finds that military interventions against (in 
favor of) the state significantly decreases (increases) the magnitude of civilian deaths, all else 
equal. 
Third, Krain (2012, 2014, 2017) and DeMeritt (2012) evaluate the effects of naming and 
shaming efforts on the magnitude of government atrocities. Krain (2012) takes a rational 
expectations perspective, namely, that government perpetrators would expect some level of 
condemnation from the international community for their actions (as formally modeled in 
DeMeritt, 2015b and Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner, 2015, 2016). Nevertheless, he writes, 
“perpetrators may not have accurately assessed the level of scrutiny and condemnation that their 
actions would incur” (Krain, 2012, p. 3). In his three articles, Krain tests the efficacy of naming 
and shaming on the degree of fatalities in genocides, 1976–2008. Krain (2012) considers several 
measures including media reports, Amnesty International (AI) background reports, and shaming 
efforts by the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), while Krain (2014, 2017) uses the 
number of AI reports only. Krain (2012, 2014, 2017) generally finds that naming and shaming 
efforts significantly reduce genocide severity. DeMeritt (2012), in turn, considers both very low-
level events (with as “few” as five civilian fatalities) as well as larger-scale killings. She 
considers three naming and shaming measure per country year: (1) number of efforts by 432 
Human Rights Organizations (HROs), (2) average number of reports by The Economist and 
Newsweek, and (3) severity of HRC punishment (also in Krain’s work). Taken one at a time 
across three regressions, she finds that the coefficient estimate for each measure is negative, and 
all but media shaming are significant. Both Krain and DeMeritt conclude that shaming can alter 
the behavior of murderous regimes and save lives during genocides and episodes of lower-level 
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of violence against civilians, respectively. This is important policy-wise because naming and 
shaming is noncoercive—and rather inexpensive.  
Fourth, to the best of our knowledge, Krain (2014, 2017) represents the only published 
articles on the effects of diplomatic and economic sanctions on genocide seriousness. Including 
controls for military interventions and naming and shaming efforts, he effectively pits three 
classes of interventions against one another. His “regression competition” finds that neither 
diplomatic nor economic sanctions significantly reduce the seriousness of ongoing genocides. 
Only anti-perpetrator/pro-target military interventions and naming and shaming have salutary 
effects.  
In sum, threat and upheaval once more emerges as a fairly clear risk factor for atrocity 
seriousness, and decent economic conditions may perhaps mitigate this risk. Among types of 
helpful third-party interventions we see somewhat consistent results emerge for the use of UN 
troops and for naming and shaming efforts. 
4.1.4 Forecasting 
The literature on mass atrocity forecasting is comparatively small. Key contributions include 
Harff (2003), Hazlett (2011), Goldsmith, et al. (2013), Rost (2013), Ulfelder (2012, 2013, 2014), 
Koren (2015), the Early Warning Project (2018), and Goldsmith and Butcher (2018). Butcher 
and Goldsmith (2016) provide a valuable survey of the mass atrocity forecasting literature. We 
focus our summary on the emergence of multimodel forecasting and on the performance and 
potential of economic variables in predicting mass atrocities. 
A common method of calibrating the predictive accuracy of forecasting models is to use the 
Receiver-Operating-Characteristic (ROC) and associated area under the curve (AUC) measure. 
In our context, AUC is the probability that a randomly selected positive case (a country-year 
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with an onset of mass atrocity) will have a higher predicted probability than a randomly selected 
negative case (a country-year without onset) (Ulfelder, 2013, p. 12). AUC ranges from 0.5 to 
one, with higher values representing better predictive power. In our view, the AUC scores 
reported in the forecasting literature are generally good. For example, based upon logit methods, 
Hazlett (2011) reports AUC scores of 0.90 and 0.93 for two in-sample genocide forecasting 
models. Goldsmith, et al.’s (2013) out-of-sample genocide forecasts achieve a score of 0.90. 
Similarly, Rost’s (2013) in-sample models for forecasting genocide and genocide conditional on 
civil war achieved mean scores of 0.90 and 0.86, respectively. Koren’s (2015) out-of-sample 
forecasts for mass atrocity conditional on internal threats achieve a mean score of 0.86 across 
multiple runs. 
Other models use unweighted, weighted, and Bayesian combinations of models (multimodel 
ensembles), which include standard logit (or rare events logit), models conditional and not 
conditional on civil wars or other serious upheavals, K-nearest neighbor (KNN) discriminant 
analysis, machine-learning methods, and random forest models (Ulfelder, 2012, 2013, 2014). 
Ulfelder’s multimodel methods lead to AUC scores of 0.75 or greater. Analyses of the Atrocity 
Forecasting Project’s (AFP) (2018) multimodel methods of genocide forecasting are also 
encouraging. Goldsmith, et al. (2013) report that the AFP’s forecasts achieved scores for out-of-
sample forecasting of 0.89 for 1988–2013 and 0.92 for 1990–2010. Goldsmith and Butcher 
(2018) report that AFP achieves scores of 0.86 for UN warnings, 0.81 for Genocide Watch 
onsets, and 0.96 for PITF-G onsets for the 2011–15 period. 
Few economic variables seem to improve forecasting results. For example, only the infant 
mortality rate (which Harff treated as a proxy of economic development) “survives the cut” in 
Goldsmith and Butcher’s (2018) genocide forecasting model. The only economic variable 
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retained in Rost’s (2013) model is real GDP per capita (performing better than the infant 
mortality rate). When Rost turned to forecasting genocide conditional on civil war, the only 
economic variable that improved predictive power was the degree of economic discrimination. In 
Ulfelder (2012), the only economic variable that improves mass atrocity forecasting is real GDP 
per capita. Hazlett (2011), however, retained two economic variables—trade openness and iron 
and steel production—in his genocide forecasting. 
Butcher and Goldsmith (2016) provide two explanations for the nonpredictive performances 
of most economic variables in genocide forecasting, and we believe their insights would also 
apply to mass atrocity forecasting. First, most economic measures widely available in datasets 
such as GDP per capita, trade, natural resource stocks or production, income inequality, and even 
commodity prices change relatively slowly over time. Even in cases of sudden economic crisis, 
more proximate drivers may be at play such as political upheaval or emerging severe 
discrimination against out-groups. Whereas economic variables can significantly affect the risk 
or represent causal elements in mass atrocity over long time periods, near-term prediction is 
improved by relying on measures of more immediate political and social conditions. Second, 
some economic variables potentially useful for atrocity forecasting have not been tried. These 
include horizontal inequality (which may be partially captured in measures of economic 
discrimination), dramatic economic decline over five or ten year periods, sudden changes in the 
financial markets of at-risk countries (for example, a sudden fall in bond ratings or the sudden 
selling of government bonds to recruit troops), and nonlinear and nonmonotonic relationships 
between economic variables and atrocity (Butcher and Goldsmith, 2016, pp. 584–5). We also 
note that trade measures widely used in risk factor studies of wars like total trade or trade 
openness have flaws that network centrality measures of trade can improve upon (Kinne, 2012). 
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To date, measures of trade networks of states have not been incorporated in mass atrocity risk or 
forecasting studies. Finally, the aggregation of economic activities inherent in broad measures 
(for instance, GDP per capita, trade openness, society-wide inequality) and in large-n cross-
country studies may “hide” shocks to particular sectors critical to a country such as the 
aforementioned coffee, tea, and tin economies prior to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  
4.1.5 Micro-level evidence in atrocity case studies 
Empirical case studies of the onset and/or spread of atrocities against civilians incorporate 
specialized datasets by regions or locales and/or by individuals (for example, “troops,” 
bystanders, victims) caught up in the violence based on actor surveys.
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 Some of these studies 
find important effects associated with economic variables, particularly those related to 
agriculture and land. For example, Gangopadhyay (2016) finds that all of his proxies for the 
barley sector (area cultivated, total output, and yield per hectare) exert a significant negative 
effect on the seriousness of Sunni-on-Shiite killings in five provinces in Pakistan, 1978–2012. 
Across 1,294 administrative units in Rwanda in 1994, Verpoorten (2012) finds evidence that 
land pressure (proxied by population density per district) and landless young men each 
significantly increased genocide seriousness. Based on surveys that tracked social and economic 
information for 350 Rwandan households before and after the genocide, Verwimp (2005) finds 
that genocide participation incentives for small landowning households (“quasi-landless 
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 Such studies include civilian victimization in Afghanistan 2003 and 2004–10 (Benini and Moulton, 2004, and 
Schutte, 2017, respectively), Bosnia in the 1990s (Schneider, Bussmann, and Ruhe, 2012; Dulić 2018), Colombia 
1988–2005 (Vargas, 2016), DR Congo and Sudan 1997–2014 (Raleigh and Choi, 2017), Germany during the 
Holocaust (Fein, 1979; Braun, 2016), German-occupied Belarus 1941–5 (Zhukov, 2016, 2017), Indonesia 1965–6 
(Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2016), Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and elsewhere 1997–2010 (Wood, 2014a), 
Mexico 1972–88 (Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub, 2018), Nepal 1996–2006 (Joshi and Quinn, 2017), Pakistan 
1978–2012 (Gangopadhyay, 2016), Rwanda 1994 (Verwimp, 2003b, 2004b, 2005, 2006; Straus, 2006, 2007b; 
McDoom, 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Verpoorten, 2012; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Brehm 2017b), Shining Path in 
Peru 1980–95 (de la Calle, 2017), Sri Lanka 1985–8 (Lilja and Hultman, 2011), civil war Spain 1936–9 (Balcells, 
2010), Stalin’s mass resettlements in the 1930s (Zhukov, 2016), sub-Saharan Africa 1997–2010 (Rezaeedaryakenari, 
Landis, and Thies, 2017), and Vietnam 1970–2 (Douglass, 2016). 
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peasants”) and those with large landholdings (“landlords”) can “be found in their respective 
relation to the land and labour markets” (p. 319). His tests provide evidence that Hutu landlords 
had something to defend (their privileged position in society) and the quasi-landless something 
to gain (land of murdered Tutsi) from genocide perpetration. Rezaeedaryakenari, Landis, and 
Thies (2017) find that rising food prices across administrative districts in sub-Saharan Africa 
significantly increase the risk and seriousness of atrocities by rebel groups. They also find that 
cultivated regions in sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to be attacked by rebels during periods 
of food insecurity. Meanwhile, Brehm (2017b) finds that communes in Rwanda with higher 
levels of formal sector employment had significantly fewer killings during the genocide, all else 
equal.  
Some of these studies recognize social networks, even if not explicitly modeled using formal 
network theory. For example, McDoom (2014a, 2014b) draws on various concepts from network 
economics to guide his empirical inquiries into genocide acceptance and propagation in Rwanda 
in 1994. McDoom (2014a) distinguishes between extremist Hutu, who favored genocide, and 
moderate Hutu who were opposed. Extremist and moderate Hutu underwent an intragroup 
competition for elite control in many areas in Rwanda once the genocide began. Based on 1994 
data for a sample of 145 communes in Rwanda, he finds that communes controlled politically 
and/or militarily by extremists succumbed relatively soon to anti-Tutsi violence, all else equal. 
He also finds that communes with high segregation experienced anti-Tutsi violence sooner 
relative to better-integrated communes. 
McDoom (2014b) analyzes factors that drew individuals from the Tare sector of Butare 
prefecture in southeastern Rwanda into perpetration during the 1994 genocide. Theorizing that 
social networks can foster or dampen individual participation in genocide based upon 
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mechanisms operating among connected individuals, his sample encompasses survey responses 
of 116 males 14 years old and older from Tare’s 647 households who were present in Tare in 
April 1994. He finds that an individual was significantly more likely to participate in genocide 
the larger his social network and the larger the number of his connections to participants. Among 
many types of ties, McDoom finds that kinship and spatial connections significantly affect 
participation risk. Importantly, McDoom (2014b) does not focus on personal characteristics of 
individuals, but on “the importance of social structure and social interaction for [understanding 
individual] participation in collective violence” (McDoom, 2014b, p. 865; our emphases) (also 
see McDoom, 2013). 
Enablers of social networking include communications and transportation networks, which 
are emerging in empirical micro studies of atrocity. For the Rwandan genocide, Yanagizawa-
Drott (2014) studies the potential role of hate radio (Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, 
RTLM) as a coordination device to incite violence (also see McDoom, 2012). Hate radio can 
have two effects, one direct (prompting listener participation in mass atrocities), the other 
indirect (prompting nonlisteners to participate as well). To arrive at statistically credible results, 
Yanagizawa-Drott exploits the quasi-random distribution of hills, flatlands, and valleys that 
affects the quality of radio signal reception. Holding other factors constant, communities in reach 
of a clear line of signal showed a significant (and quantitatively large) increase in genocide 
participation. So did neighboring communities, due to spatial spillovers on social networks, 
suggesting triggering and coordination effects facilitated by hate radio, even to the extent that the 
aggregate spillover effects exceed the direct effects. Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) estimates that 





 Adena, et al. (2015) use a similar Irregular Terrrain Model 
(ITM) design to study the effect of radio in Germany before and after Hitler’s ascent to the 
chancellorship. Not only do they confirm the qualitative findings in Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), 
but they are able to establish that the reinforcing effect of radio propaganda depends on 
predispositions to accept hate messages and that pro-hate propaganda can backfire in 
communities with higher dispositions of tolerance toward out-group members. Such studies 
begin to link theoretical models of identity, networks, and hate to empirical applications. 
Relatedly, a recent study documents how Israeli attacks in the Palestinian Occupied Territories 
appear causally related to time periods when U.S. media divert attention to large-scale sporting 
events or natural catastrophes (Durante and Zhuravskaya, 2018). 
Micro empirical studies of atrocity also are incorporating the influence of transportation 
networks on atrocity risk and seriousness (Verpoorten, 2012; Rogall, 2015; Zhukov, 2016, 2017; 
Brehm 2017b). For example, as noted previously, for the period 1945–59 Zhukov (2016) 
geocodes 2.65 million arrest records for Stalin’s population control campaigns and finds that 
Stalin was less willing to force remotely located civilians to move (including to Gulag camps) 
the further away they lived from a railway station and the greater the distance to a camp. 
Studying atrocities committed by Nazi forces in German-occupied Belarus (1941–5) 
(specifically, the burning of 8,526 villages and the killing of hundreds of thousands of civilians), 
Zhukov (2017) finds that when resistance groups attacked German military targets (personnel 
and buildings), indiscriminate retaliations against civilians were swift and severe. But when the 
opposition attacked German transport networks, particularly railroads, retaliations against 
civilians were much lower. Whether intending to or not, by targeting transport the opposition 
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the Rwandan genocide. He does report, however, that some key agents were catalyzed by RTLM broadcasts into 
genocide participation in some locations. 
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created a demand for the use of local labor to repair the damage, thus reducing killings. As one 
German official in Belarus stated: “We needed that population to clear the railroad tracks” 
(quoted in Zhukov, 2017, p. 68).  
4.2 Summative evaluation and key issues for future empirical work 
Thriving streams of empirical mass atrocity research have emerged. Measures of threat or 
upheaval generally correlate strongly to atrocities in both analytical and forecasting studies. 
Other variable measures such as political regime level (not transition), ethnic diversity and 
polarization, trade openness, and natural resources show mixed results. For the large-n studies, 
low real GDP per capita and high economic discrimination seem to be the only economic 
variables that correlate to greater atrocity risk or seriousness, but the results are not as consistent 
as they are for threat/upheaval. Moreover, economic discrimination (as distinct from general 
economic and political discrimination and other measures of social fragmentation) has been 
tested in very few large-n empirical atrocity studies. Only in the micro-level case studies do we 
see economic conditions, particularly those related to land and agricultural and to 
communications, transportation, and social networks, as statistically significant factors in 
explaining atrocity risk and seriousness. Regarding third-party efforts, only three clear patterns 
have emerged. First, UN commitment of soldiers into ongoing atrocities significantly reduces 
atrocity seriousness; commitment of (mere) observers significantly increases seriousness. 
Second, most naming and shaming efforts by organizations significantly reduce atrocity 
seriousness. Third, neither diplomatic nor economic sanctions significantly reduce the 
seriousness of ongoing genocides. Empirical results on various types of military interventions 
into ongoing genocides are mixed. Some types of military interventions seem to worsen atrocity 
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seriousness, and “norm interventions” by the international community have the potential to 
backfire (Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner, 2015).  
By way of reflection, we highlight five challenges as empirical research progresses. First, the 
literature has led to few cumulative results and has made little headway in sorting out competing 
theories and predictions. For example, most empirical studies include a linear or loglinear 
measure of political regime level; very few consider nonlinearities. Only two risk studies of 
which we are aware consider political regime transition, as distinct from level (Fein, 1995; 
Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner, 2015); only one considers the differences between the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries (Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat, 2006; but see Taylor, Pevehouse, and Straus, 
2017, on low-level VAC and elections in sub-Saharan Africa.) Insufficient theorizing and 
empirical analysis also concerns the potential effect of trade openness on atrocity risk or 
seriousness. Inclusion of the variable is usually predicated on the untested idea that atrocity 
presumably leads to trade disruption which, in turn, is costly economically or politically. The 
interstate and civil war literatures long ago tested the proposition that war disrupts trade (Bayer 
and Rupert, 2004; Glick and Taylor, 2010). But in the atrocity literature, we do not know 
whether atrocities (controlling for other forms of violence such as wars) disrupt trade. Finally, 
we are surprised by how small is the empirical literature on third-party intervention. We need to 
learn what interventions work and why, especially regarding noncoercive and coercive (military) 
interventions.  
Second, few empirical studies are guided by formal theoretical models.
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 Formal models help 
distinguish between competing accounts of phenomena and guide in selecting the best measures 
of theoretical variables. For example, Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner’s (2015) theoretical model of 
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Anderton and Ryan (2016); Gangopadhyay (2016); Vargas (2016). 
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genocide risk requires that they incorporate a measure of political regime transition (as distinct 
from level) and oil production or flow (as distinct from natural resource abundance or stocks 
often found in other studies). DeMeritt’s (2015a, 2015b) principal-agent model of government 
delegation of atrocity actions to perpetrator “troops finds both theoretically and empirically that 
the decision of a government to kill civilians and, if to kill, how many civilians to target depends 
on the type of military intervention directed to the government (either against or in favor of the 
government) and on the nature of the government-perpetrator (principal-agent) interaction (see 
also DeMeritt, 2012; Krain, 2012; Machain and Rosenberg, 2018). The mass atrocity empirical 
literature could stand refinement of measures of key explanatory and control variables as guided 
by theory and, from this development, push toward discerning which theoretical perspectives 
hold up well and finding out whether any cumulative results emerge. 
Third, even with current progress in empirical research, we note striking gaps. For example, 
to our knowledge, no forecasting studies address atrocities committed by nonstate groups, even 
as they seem to be as frequent as those perpetrated by states in datasets in which the two actor 
classes overlap (Section 2). We also see relatively few empirical studies of the transition from 
relatively low to high levels of atrocity (exceptions include DeMeritt, 2015a; Quinn, 2015; 
Anderton and Ryan, 2016). Another concern regards the strong focus on perpetrators (states and 
nonstate actors) as distinct from studies of actions of bystanders and victims (exceptions include 
studies of third-party interventions). Brauer and Caruso (2016) provide theoretical guidance that 
could aid such empirical inquiry. Further, we note that large-n cross section studies focus upon 
countries, regions, or locales in which the dependent variable (atrocity onset or occurrence) is 1 
or 0, but (to our knowledge) studies do not consider why some groups are targeted (1) and others 
not (0) within and across countries. Finally, also lacking are theoretical and empirical inquiries 
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into the connections between structural conditions that elevate the risk of atrocities and catalytic 
events or “triggers” that can tip a risky situation into atrocity onset. Straus (2015) provides 
guidance on how triggers might be defined and better integrated into future empirical work.  
Fourth, it is often assumed, implicitly (and occasionally explicitly), that genocides and other 
mass atrocities occur during or in the late stage or immediate aftermath of wars (civil, interstate, 
and colonial). This is reflected in many empirical models by the presence of a lagged measure of 
civil (and/or other) war. Certainly, many mass atrocities occur after a war has started, but a large 
number of exceptions exist as documented earlier in Section 2.4. Why wars and mass atrocities 
are sometimes interdependent (but with varied timings of interdependence) and sometimes not 
has not been seriously considered in formal theoretical models and empirical inquiry. This is true 
of both the mass atrocity and the civil war literatures.
68
  
Fifth, we conclude this subsection by summarizing Douglass’ (2016) work. Important in its 
own right, it also points to critical data issues. He studies the U.S. Phoenix Program, 1968–72, 
run during the Vietnam War. This included a targeting database of 73,712 civilians suspected of 
supporting North Vietnamese forces, 15,438 of whom were eventually killed. Applying machine 
learning to the data, patterns of missing values, meanings of different variables, and 
heterogeneity of observations can be questioned.
69
 Douglass finds numerous problems with the 
data that needed to be dealt with prior to empirical analysis. He concludes that such detail 
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 We make two additional observations. First, scholars date the onset of the prototypical mass atrocity of the 
twentieth century—the Holocaust—to 1933, whereas the mass killing began with the onset of World War II in 1939. 
More broadly, case study research of twentieth century genocides by Bartrop (2002) leads him to conclude that 
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conflict does not have to be present for a genocide to occur” (p. 531). Second, to our knowledge, Schneider, 
Bussmann, and Ruhe’s (2012) micro-study of civilian violence in the Bosnian civil war is the only article that 
theoretical justifies and empirically supports a hypothesis that perpetrators commit fewer atrocity acts during or in 
the immediate aftermath of territorial conquests (see their H3, p. 448).  
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“typically get[s] relegated to an error term” (p. 561) and that an analyst “could reach 
dramatically different conclusions about outcomes by truncating the sample just to killings, by 
omitting information about the suspect’s position [e.g., rank in opposition forces] or the 
government actor committing the violence [e.g., which branch of government or foreign forces], 
or by missing important details about how the [data-capturing] institution[s] created records and 
aggregated them into a final dataset” (p. 562). As increasing numbers of local datasets become 
available from mass atrocity research, it may be appropriate to initiate pre-theoretical, machine-
driven queries to discover data dimensionality and structure prior to building out theory and 
empirical testing of hypotheses. 
 
5. Toward Prevention: Resetting Context, Reconditioning Choices, Reshaping Consequences 
The literatures we have surveyed in many ways echo Scott Straus’ caution in his review of 
atrocity prevention tools and strategies: “… atrocity prevention is difficult” (Straus, 2016, p. 
viii).
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 A survey and assessment of mass atrocity prevention efforts and tools through an 
economics lens remains to be written. That said, in the preceding pages, we indicated in many 
places how a view informed by economic theory can provide new insights into understanding 
and, possibly, preventing mass atrocities, for instance, the relative ease of (yet limits to) atrocity 
input substitution and of intervention backfiring conditions (from standard theory), the role of 
motivated beliefs and (self)-narratives (behavioral economics), of identity manipulation, 
preference falsification, and atrocity up-scaling (identity and social network economics), and of 
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the institutional design of atrocity games (political economy). To illustrate with just one more 
example, Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner (2015, 2016) highlight an underappreciated rationale for 
killing people for economic reasons. If an in-group views people of an out-group as chattel—an 
economic resource to be exploited—then imposing conditions that reduce this economic value to 
the in-group can backfire and lead to quicker and harsher atrocities committed against the out-
group.  
 In what follows, we indicate briefly what we believe are two novel economics-informed 
avenues regarding atrocity prevention, one cautionary, one perhaps more hopeful. First, we 
expand on the theme that democracy is neither a necessary nor sufficient antidote to prevent 
atrocities (Section 5.1). Second, lack of “political will” to prevent mass atrocities is often 
bemoaned (Straus, 2016) yet concepts involving the design of (global) public goods seem readily 
applicable to explain this lack of will. One of the global goods in question is international law. 
By way of illustration, we discuss the economics of the design of international law (5.2).  
5.1 Democracy, institutions, and law 
Democracy, to first stay within the nation-state realm, is frequently mentioned as an atrocity 
prevention tool. A series of papers by Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2015; with the other papers 
cited there) explore democracy and nondemocracy as political institutions. For instance, their 
2012 paper generates two insights: First, that a Pareto inefficient “social arrangement is made 
stable by the instability of alternative arrangements” and, second that “efficiency-enhancing 
changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender” (p. 1446). The fear of 
future instability—even if post-instability efficiency were enhanced—can keep an inefficient 
system of governance stable. What counts is regime stability, not its form as democratic or 
nondemocratic. “Nudging” nondemocratic regimes in the democratic direction can backfire. 
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Threats of transition create “openings in the political opportunity structure” (Krain, 1997). Once 
achieved, democracy may well be desirable, but the path to get there can be bloody indeed.  
In this regard, Myerson (2011, 2016) argues that the United States was mistaken in postwar 
Iraq to impose, by means of constitutional law, a centralized regime on the country, a nudge in 
the wrong direction as it de-incentivized the local and regional proving grounds of future 
national-level leaders. Myerson argues that it is at the local level that future leaders first can 
demonstrate their ability to manage public affairs in constituents’ best interest. If leaders pass the 
local test, they may in the future be elected to head up a region-wide office and, in time, perhaps 
advance to the national level. If, in contrast, the constitutional setup favors the national level, 
then—to ensure their continuing hold on national power—potential leaders will want to create 
regional and local vassals. Intermediate-level holders of power, instead of being responsible to 
local voters, become beholden to the national leader. Political theorist Stephen Krasner (2011) 
makes a related point, arguing that intellectual preoccupations in international relations theory 
have forgotten the extent to which external powers can influence a state’s internal power 
arrangements, possibly the most drastic example of which is the writing of a new constitution for 
a defeated or an occupied state as in Myerson’s concern over postwar Iraq. 
Taking an economic look at comparative constitutional law, post-mass atrocity, may be a 
useful exercise (for example, for such wide-ranging cases such as Colombia, East Timor, 
Germany, Iraq, Japan, and Nepal). Constitutions are, fundamentally, about setting, or changing, 
the rules of the political game to create preferred political structures. Verwimp’s (2004a) study 
of nested games in Rwanda in the early 1990s is a powerful example of this: When the structure 
of the existing transition and civil war games proved inconvenient for then-dictator 
Habyarimana, the games first were collapsed into a single game and, eventually, into no game at 
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all with the elimination of the Tutsi population. In the world of business, modern management 
theory boils this down to the dictum of “strategy before structure.”  
5.2 Global public goods and the economics of international law 
If “strategy before structure” is one way to think about how actors can shackle (or unshackle) 
themselves to forestall (or permit) mass atrocities, then we enter the realm of law, broadly 
conceived, and of the economics of law. This includes the literatures on global public goods in 
general and the design of international human rights or other treaties in particular (Arce, 2000; 
Sandler, 1997; Sandler, 2004; Peinhardt and Sandler, 2015). For instance, the “too little, too late” 
phenomenon routinely observed at United Nations Security Council deliberations regarding 
sanctions and/or interventions in acute cases of mass atrocity can be explained, in part, by the 
difficulty that would-be intervening states experience to capture benefits commensurate with 
their budgetary and nonbudgetary (for example, reputational) costs. For intervening countries, 
these costs are highly specific and local to their political decisionmakers, taxpayers, and voters, 
yet any benefits obtained can be hard to pin down. In this regard, Richard Posner’s Economic 
Analysis of Law textbook (2014) contains an illuminating, if slim, chapter on Comparative and 
International Law, with even slimmer sections on the economic analysis of international treaties 
and domestic law such as the U.S. Alien Tort Statute of 1789 which may be relevant to 
addressing human rights violations occurring elsewhere. Somewhat expanded coverage, with 
sections on the use of force, the conduct of war, human rights, and international criminal law, is 
offered in Economic Foundations of International Law (E. Posner and Sykes, 2013). An 
economics and law overview with applications drawn by analogy from property, contract, tort, 
and criminal law, and from international law to mass atrocities is in Brauer, Anderton, and Schap 
(2016). The crux of the matter revolves around the costs and benefits of negotiating binding and 
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enforceable international treaties in the absence of supranational authorities. R. Posner notes, for 
instance, that while negotiating a multilateral treaty is less costly than negotiating a large number 
of bilateral treaties, these costs still are substantial and among the reasons that relevant treaties 
often are single-issue treaties with relatively low performance thresholds. To bargain for a larger 
set of benefits, the costs might exceed what nation-states might be willing to commit in present 
and future expected costs.  
R. Posner also notes that the absence of supranational authorities need not be a problem if 
treaties (a form of contract) are self-enforcing, for example via reputation effects or when current 
or future benefits are alienable (revocable). Thus, the European Union for instance already links 
accession by additional states to “a certain level of adherence to human rights norms and law” 
(Brauer, Anderton, and Schap, 2016, p. 657), a big bone of contention in the on-and-off talks 
between the EU and Turkey for example. Moreover, the EU challenges and threatens punishment 
when existing members violate norms, as it did in 2015 in regard to Hungary’s immigration 
policy regarding refugees from the Syrian mass atrocity or in late 2017 after Poland issued a 
reform law threatening the independence of its judiciary to the dislike of the other 27 EU 
members who then issued an ultimatum on 20 December 2017, under Article 7 of the 1999 
Treaty of Amsterdam, to compel Poland to rescind, or sufficiently revise, the reform law or else 
face sanctions such as loss of EU voting rights. 
Further, R. Posner hints at why nation-states may be quite reputable in regard to some 
international treaties yet less so in regard to others. He explains that “[s]ince the costs and 
benefits of compliance vary across commitments, violation of one may be weak or even no 
evidence of the likelihood of violating another, where the benefits of compliance may be much 
greater” (2014, p. 996). In a similar vein, Shaffer (2012) notes that international laws as 
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instances of global public goods can be rivalrous to multiple national laws and to each other. 
Combined with Hirshleifer’s (1983) insight that some (global) public goods are best-shot, 
weakest-link, or aggregate effort goods or services and the insight that atrocity “bads” come in 
various forms (genocide, for instance, is a “club bad” whereas a random shooting of some among 
an assembled group of villagers is a “common-resource pool bad” and poison gassing is an 
unmitigated “public bad”), Shaffer (2012) argues that differently designed international treaties 
are needed to address different specific situations. For example, if the United States were the sole 
(super)power able to effectively intervene in a mass atrocity occurring elsewhere, then 
prevention or mitigation of the harm done would be subject to cost-benefit considerations of the 
United States alone. The world would be held hostage to the self-interest of a single state. But 
were the law designed as an instance of global administrative law, one or more actors could be 
“deputized” on a case by case basis to address an imminent or ongoing atrocity and be held 
responsible for its (in)actions.
71
 Similarly, weakest-link global public goods might best be dealt 
with under legal pluralism rather than universal law. Only aggregate effort global public goods to 
prevent certain types of mass atrocities might require a global constitutionalist approach, Shaffer 
argues. 
 Given the vastness and substantive depth of law and economics scholarship, and given its 
corresponding paucity of application to the pressing issue of mass atrocity prevention, we 
suspect that great advances are possible in this arena of scholarship. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We conclude with nine observations. First, it seems fair to say that across the tributaries of 
                                                     
71
 “States … developed administrative law accountability mechanisms to apply to agencies, given that legislatures 
were unable to oversee them sufficiently. International institutions can be viewed analogously to national 
government agencies, in that both involve a delegation of power to an unelected body” (Shaffer, 2012, pp. 687–8). 
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economic theory laid out in this article many high-quality contributions have been made, albeit 
from angles so dispersed and diverse that a distinct ‘economics of mass atrocities’ had not, as 
yet, come into focus. Second, empirical work is not always as explicitly and formally grounded 
in theory as economists should like and few consensus results have emerged. Conversely, much 
of the work in theory is in need of empirical testing. Our ignorance still is great. Third, both 
theory and empirics frequently equate mass atrocities with genocides (including politicides), 
missing the large universe of cases that are not genocides. Moreover, fourth, theoretical and the 
empirical work predominantly address just the most egregious type of genocidal atrocities—
killings—overlooking other types of genocides such as enslavement for economic gain or forced 
assimilation policies to destroy a people-group’s cultural coherence and identity. The dual focus 
on genocides and killings is reinforced by databases that in their majority still tend to collate 
information on “massive mass atrocities” (1,000+ people killed). Fifth, the purpose and design of 
current databases, then, seems in need of debate. It appears, for example, that many “within-
nation” atrocities—from Afghanistan to Colombia and India and from Pakistan to Venezuela and 
Zimbabwe—for which local-based, local-language data either exist or can be found are not 
included in the dominant, cross-national, English-language databases empirical researchers tend 
to access. Valuable as they are, extant studies tend to default to “convenience datasets,” 
potentially skewing derived knowledge. Difficult as the task will be, new, or newly expanded, 
databases should cover years before 1900, should cover all atrocity perpetrators (not just modern 
nation-states), and should cover all sizes, types of, and motives for, mass atrocity.  
 Sixth, inasmuch as economics makes universal claims about how economic laws hold across 
time, space, and agents, the preponderance of theoretical and empirical mass atrocity studies 
devoted to the post-Holocaust era, while important, is lacking in imagination and scope. If, for 
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instance, social networks are important in today’s cases, surely they were important in, say, 
medieval times. The explanatory and predictive power of theory lies, in part, in its universal 
reach. By expanding studies more broadly across time, space, and actors, possible anomalies to 
theory may be discovered, and corrected, more quickly than otherwise. Seventh, theoretical work 
has emphasized the nature and role of atrocity perpetrators and much less so of types of 
bystanders and victims; similarly, the empirical work has emphasized the study of atrocity onset, 
seriousness, and (less so) of intervention as one type of bystander activity but far less so the 
study of perpetrators and, again, of victims. Victims are not without agency, especially in the 
early stages of victimization; we might learn much from studying their behavior. Eighth, it seems 
to us that many economic specialties can usefully contribute to the study of mass atrocities. As 
illustrated in Section 5, a ready pool of scholarship exists in the field of law and economics that 
can be transported to the study of mass atrocity and its prevention. Similarly, the economics of 
(organized and other) crime surely contains insights and tools of use to the study of mass 
atrocity. Likewise, knowledge gained in the economics of culture can be grafted onto the study 
of the looting and the destruction of tangible cultural artifacts not just in wartime but as a way of 
collapsing a people-group’s self-understanding and self-identification. Further, a large, and often 
ingenious, literature in experimental economics, including conflict-linked experiments, may well 
be adaptable to tease out more knowledge regarding mass atrocity-related behavior. Ninth, going 
beyond personalized theories of behavior, far more research is needed drawing on social context 
and network models. As Mueller (1990) and others show, much prevention comes in the form of 
changes in culture-wide attitudes and institutional reforms that help shape individual behavior. 
Tortures such as quartering, crucifying, and drowning, and generalized violence on account of 
race, religion, sex, age, or mental capacity all are becoming less thinkable and rarer than in times 
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past, not because human nature has changed but because institutional and social control 
mechanisms have changed (Pinker, 2011). As such, studying mass atrocities not merely as 
instances of an economics of war, violence, and insecurity but studying their prevention as 
exemplars toward the creation of stable, irreversible structures of peace (Boulding, 1978) seems 
appropriate. 
 Perpetrated by constantly changing types and compositions of actors, mass atrocities take on 
many forms and occur with some frequency and regularity even today, in war- and in peacetime. 
They cause enormous damage to human and economic development and with adverse effects 
often counted over generations. The economics profession—with its particular brand of logic, 
mathematics, and statistics and its broad sweep of theories from which to draw—is well 
positioned to make further valuable contributions to the study of mass atrocities and, we trust, to 
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Note: Mass atrocities (estimated fatalities) plotted at onset year.  
Data Sources: Authors’ compilation. See Appendix. 
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Figure 3: Networked Tentacles of Atrocity Perpetration 
 







































Figure 4: Types of Dictator Equilibria in Wintrobe’s Loyalty-Repression Model 
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Datasets and Protocols To Identify Mass Atrocity Cases and Fatalities per Case, 1990–2017 
I. Civilian Atrocity Datasets  
The following civilian atrocity datasets and one war dataset were used to (1) create the 
scatterplot of mass atrocity cases (Figure 1), (2) present mass atrocity fatality estimates, and (3) 
identify the start and end dates of mass atrocity cases in order to analyze state-perpetrated mass 
atrocity overlaps with wars. 
1. Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat (EKG) (2006) state-perpetrated mass killing cases for the period 
1900–44. 
2. Ulfelder and Valentino (UV) (2008) state-perpetrated mass killing cases for the period 1945–
2006. 
3. Political Instability Task Force Gen-Politicide Dataset (PITF-G) for state-perpetrated 
genocides and politicides for the period 1956–2017 (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, 2018). 
4. Uppsala Conflict Data Program One-Sided Violence Against Civilians Dataset (UCDP-V) 
for state- perpetrated civilian killings for the period 2007–17 and for nonstate actor-
perpetrated civilian killings from 1989–2017 (Eck and Hultman, 2007; Allansson and Croicu, 
2017). 
5. Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Dataset (PITF-W) to code “unidentified 
perpetrator mass atrocity cases” only, which covered the period 1995–2017 
(http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.dir/atrocities.html). 
6. Armed Conflict and Location Event Dataset (ACLED) to code unidentified perpetrator mass 
atrocity cases only, which covered Africa for the period 1997–2017, the Middle East for the 
period 2016–7, and parts of Asia for the period 2010–7 (Armed Conflict Location & Event 
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Data Project (ACLED) (acleddata.com); Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, and Karlsen, 2010). 
7. Correlates of War (COW) Project Interstate, Intrastate, and Extrastate Wars for the period 
1900–2007 (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war). 
II. Coding Protocols for State-Perpetrated Mass Atrocity Cases 
1. State-Perpetrated Mass Atrocities, 1900–44 
We identified state-perpetrated mass atrocity cases for the 1900–44 period from EGK for cases 
in which at least 1,000 civilians were reported killed. If EGK reported a range of civilians killed, 
we estimated civilian deaths as the average of the two numbers. Atrocity cases in EGK in which 
fewer than 1,000 civilians were killed or no civilian fatalities were reported were excluded from 
our data analysis. Atrocity cases in EGK that had onset years prior to 1900 were excluded from 
our analysis even if the atrocities continued into 1900 or later. One case in EGK (China 1920s–
49) did not have a point estimate for the onset year and was coded in the scatterplot with an onset 
year of 1925. 
2. State-Perpetrated Mass Atrocities, 1945–54 
We identified state-perpetrated mass atrocity cases for the 1945–54 period from UV. All cases in 
UV involve the intentional killing of at least 1,000 noncombatants from a discrete group 
(Ulfelder and Valentino, 2008, p. 2). For each case, UV report low and a high fatality estimates. 
We took the average of the two estimates to arrive at our measure of estimated fatalities. 
3. State-Perpetrated Mass Atrocities, 1955–2006 
We identified state-perpetrated mass atrocity cases for the 1955–2006 period from UV and PITF-
G. When the two datasets had overlapping cases, we recorded only one case in order to avoid 
double counting. The case that was chosen was the one that provided the higher fatality estimate. 
For UV, the fatality estimate was determined by the averaging protocol described in II.2. For 
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PITF-G, death magnitude indexes were provided for each year of each case. We used the 
midpoint of PITF-G’s death magnitude index range to determine the fatality estimate for each 
year. For example, the death magnitude index for Sudan for 2002 was 2.5, indicating that 
estimated civilian fatalities that year ranged from 8,000–16,000, which we recorded as 12,000 in 
estimated fatalities. A complication arose in several PITF-G cases in which a year had a death 
magnitude index of 5, which signified estimated fatalities of 256,000 or more. Since a midpoint 
estimate could not be determined for index=5 years, we turned to Harff (2003, p. 60), a precursor 
of the PITF-G data, to estimate fatalities for cases in which at least one year contained an index 
of 5 for death magnitude.
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4. State-Perpetrated Mass Atrocities, 2007–17 
We identified state-perpetrated mass atrocity cases for the 2007–17 period from the PITF-G 
dataset and by applying the UV coding protocol for mass killings to the UCDP-V data on civilian 
killings by governments. The UV coding protocol embodies the following: 
A mass killing is “any event in which the actions of state agents result in the intentional death 
of at least 1,000 noncombatants from a discrete group in a period of sustained violence” 
(Ulfelder and Valentino, 2008, p. 2, emphasis removed);  
and 
“Mass killing events were considered to have begun in the first year in which at least 100 
intentional noncombatant fatalities occurred. If fewer than 100 total fatalities are recorded 
annually for any three consecutive years during the event, the event was considered to have 
ended during the first year within that three-year period in in which fatalities dropped below 
100 per year (even if killing continues at lower levels in later years)” (Ulfelder and 
                                                     
72
 This led to the following cases and fatality estimates from Harff (2003) included in our set of mass atrocity cases: 
Cambodia 1975-79, 2,700,000; Pakistan 1971, 2,000,000; and Rwanda 1995, 750,000. Also included is one case -- 
Sudan 1983-2002, 2,012,000 – that combined Harff (2003) data for 1983-2001 and PITF-G data for 2002. 
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Valentino, 2008, p. 7). 
When the cases from PITF-G and the UV protocoled UCDP-V overlapped, we recorded only one 
case in order to avoid double counting. The case that was chosen was the one that provided the 
higher fatality estimate. For UCDP-V, the fatality estimate was the dataset’s “best” estimate 
rather than an average of its low and high estimates.  
III. Coding Protocols for Nonstate Actor-Perpetrated Mass Atrocity Cases, 1989–2017 
We applied the UV coding protocol in II.4 above to the UCDP-V data on civilian killings by 
nonstate actors (NSAs) to identify NSA mass atrocity cases and estimated fatalities per case. The 
fatality estimate for each NSA case was UCDP-V’s “best” estimate rather than an average of its 
low and high estimates. PITF-G also provides several cases of NSA-perpetrated genocides.
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When PITF-G and UCDP-V-created NSA cases overlapped, we recorded only one case in order 
to avoid double counting. The case that was chosen was the one that provided the higher fatality 
estimate. 
IV. Coding Protocols for Unidentified Actor-Perpetrated Mass Atrocity Cases, 1995–2017 
Identifying mass atrocity cases perpetrated by “unidentified actors” is fraught with problems. If 
the actors in civilian killings are unidentified, they cannot be tied to a unified decisionmaking 
process or party responsible. As such, it is difficult to claim that civilian fatalities caused by 
unidentified actors cohere as a case of mass atrocity. Nevertheless, the growth of atrocity acts 
perpetrated by unknown actors has become a palpable empirical phenomenon, so we take 
preliminary steps in our article to track such cases. Two datasets that track atrocities by unknown 
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 The nonstate cases from PITF-G include the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria from 2014-17 and Seleka and anti-
Balaka militias in the Central African Republic from 2013-17. A complication arose in the PITF-G dataset in that 
two of the cases indicated that genocidal activity was perpetrated by the Angolan government and National Union 
for the Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels (the two cases spanned the years 1975-1994 and 1998-2002). In 
these two cases, we assigned half of the estimated fatalities to the state (Angola) and the other half to the NSA 
(UNITA). This procedure generated two additional NSA mass atrocity cases in the scatterplot (i.e., UNITA 1975 
and 1998) based on the PITF-G data. 
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actors are PITF-W and ACLED. 
We applied the following protocols to the PITF-W dataset to generate mass atrocity cases 
perpetrated by unidentified actors: (1) The case must meet the criteria in the UV mass atrocity 
protocol noted in section II.4 above. (2) Fatalities from unidentified attacks are counted on a 
country-year basis. (3) Suicide attacks are generally recorded as perpetrator unknown, but the 
PITF-W codebook indicates that the source of suicide attacks is often known. As such, we 
excluded data points in which the main source of attack was a suicide attack. (4) When estimated 
fatalities spanned a range, we used the low number of the range; when estimated fatalities was 
“many,” we coded it as 5 fatalities (the low end of fatalities per attack tracked by PITF-W); when 
estimated fatalities was “dozens,” we coded it as 24. These procedures led to eight unidentified 
actor mass atrocity cases from the PITF-W dataset from 1995–2017. 
 We applied protocols 1, 2, and the first part of 4 in the previous paragraph to the ACLED 
data. The suicide attack issue and estimated fatalities of “many” and “dozens” were not 
applicable to the ACLED data. These procedures led to six unidentified actor mass atrocity cases 
from the ACLED dataset from 1997–2017. These cases did not overlap with the unidentified 
cases from the PITF-W dataset, leading to 14 unidentified cases in the scatterplot in Figure 1. 
V. State-Perpetrated Mass Atrocities Overlaps with Wars 
A substantial portion of the empirical literature on mass atrocity risks includes a lagged measure 
of war (inter-, intra-, and/or extra-state) or other form of armed conflict as a right side 
explanatory or control variable. Our data analysis, however, finds that less than half of mass 
atrocities occur after war onset and that a nonnegligible number of mass atrocities begin before 
war onset or occur outside the context of war (see article Section 2). Our coding protocols to 
determine the overlap, or lack of overlap, between mass atrocity and war are as follows. 
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1. We use the COW dataset’s onset and end years for inter-, intra-, and extra-state wars. All 
such wars involve at least one state. 
2. We use our compiled dataset of state-perpetrated mass atrocities using the onset and end 
years available in the data sources we use. 
3. We line up each mass atrocity in our dataset with any war, even if it is obvious that the war 
has nothing to do with the mass atrocity. Note that this protocol is “conservative,” that is, it 
creates a mass atrocity/war overlap even if there is not an obvious mass atrocity/war overlap. 
4. If a mass atrocity overlaps with many wars, we use the notes from the data sources for mass 
atrocities (EGK, UV, or PITF-G) to identify which war the mass atrocity lines up with and go 
with that one. 
5. If the previous protocol does not give rise to an obvious war in which to make the alignment, 
we choose “conservatively,” that is, we go with the war that is least advantageous to our 
claim that mass atrocities do not generally occur contemporaneously with or in the later 
stages of war.  
VI. Comparison of Mass Atrocity Fatalities with Intrastate War Fatalities 
Our estimates in the article of 347 intrastate wars and 4,893,230 associated battle-related 
fatalities for the period 1900–2015 are based on intrastate war data from the Correlates of War 
Project (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war) for the years 1900–2007 and the 
Uppsala Armed Conflict dataset (http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/) for civil and internationalized 
civil wars from 2008–15. 
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